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Mental Hospital Drugs, Professionalism,
and the Constitution
SHELDON GELMAN*

Until 1953, a social, medical, and legal consensus favored confinement of
the mentally ill in state hospitals as the preferred means of dealing with serious
mental illness.' State policy toward serious mental illness was premised on the
principle that, when necessary, the mentally ill should be held in public cushospitals, where physical and mechanical restraints
tody, in state psychiatric
2
were liberally used.
Life in a mid-twentieth century state mental hospital was regimented, degrading, and hopeless. 3 Hospitals housed patients in bleak, dangerous, and
overcrowded wards; disordered behavior within the psychiatric institutions
was controlled through seclusion techniques and, as already noted, close physical restraints. 4 The duration of hospitalization was normally measured in
years, with many patients living out their lives in state hospitals. 5 The medications used in the state facilities were addictive sedatives, which had no specific
effect on serious mental illness. 6 Electroshock and insulin shock treatments
were freely employed, and other patients were lobotomized; these treatments
7
did nothing, however, to reduce the burgeoning state hospital population.
8
In 1953, the advent of a new family of psychiatric drugs revolutionized
state mental health systems. 9 The drugs immediately were recognized as a
* Associate Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. A.B., Rutgers College; J.D.,
Rutgers School of Law; LL.M., Harvard Law School. From 1977, when Rennie v. Klein was filed, until
the Supreme Court remand in 1982, the author managed that right-to-refuse medication lawsuit for the
plaintiffs' attorney of record, the New Jersey Department of the Public Advocate.
Acknowledgements are due the Cleveland-Marshall Enrichment Fund, for supporting this research;
Joel J. Finer and Jean Lifter, for commenting on the manuscript; and Alexander D. Brooks, for teaching me about the problems examined in this study.
1. For a view of state psychiatry just prior to the drug regime, see A. DEUTSCH, SHAME OF THE
STATES

(1948).

2. For discussions of the structure of the public mental health system prior to 1950, see A. DEUTSCH,
THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA: A HISTORY OF THEIR CARE AND TREATMENT FROM COLONIAL

TIMES (2d ed. 1949); G. GROB, MENTAL INSTITUTIONS INAMERICA: SOCIAL POLICY TO 1895 (1975); D.
ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE NEW REPUBLIC

(1971).
3. See general,y E. GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS (1961).
4. D. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES IN PRO-

GRESSIVE AMERICA 356 (1980).
5. Id at 350 (more than half of patients in state mental hospital remained in institution for 5 years,
and more than one-third of patients had been institutionalized for more than 10 years).
6. Id at 344.
7. Blackwell, Schizophrenia and Neuroleptic Drugs.- A4 Biopsychosocial Perspectie,in REFUSING
TREATMENT IN MENTAL HEALTH INSTITUTIONS-VALUES IN CONFLICT 3, 8 (A.E. Doudera & J. Swazey eds. 1982) (prior to introduction of drug therapy, course of individual psychoses appears to have
been unaffected by mode of treatment) [hereinafter cited as REFUSING TREATMENT]; J. TALBOTT, THE
DEATH OF THE ASYLUM 32 (1978) (state mental hospital populations rose steadily until 1955).
8. These drugs, as a class, are called "major tranquilizers," "neuroleptics," or "antipsychotics." The
word "drug" is used in this article to refer to these agents, unless the context indicates otherwise.
9. For reviews of the changes in state hospital psychiatry since 1950, see Bassuk & Gerson, Deinstitutionalizationand Mental Health Services, Sci. AM., Feb. 1978 at 46; Becker & Schulberg, Phasing Out
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powerful addition to the psychiatric treatment arsenal.' 0 Their first generic
name, "major tranquilizer," suggested as much, as did the trade names of certain new drugs: "Thorazine," "Largactil," and "Prolixin.""I State institutions
across the country quickly adopted the drugs because of their psychiatric
promise. Before the end of the decade, the new drugs had become the state
hospitals' primary measure for dealing with serious mental illness, supplanting
the older measures; 12 by the middle of the next decade, drugs had displaced3
state hospitals themselves as the centerpiece of public mental health systems.1
Inside state hospitals, insulin shock, lobotomy, and in many instances, electroshock treatment, have yielded to the use of drugs.' 4 Similarly, seclusion
and physical restraints are much less in evidence, since high drug doses usually
accomplish the same ends.' 5 Average hospitalizations are measured now in
days and weeks-not in years and lives.' 6 Indeed, when the mentally ill wish
to be hospitalized, they may find it difficult to gain admission and more diffiState Hospitals-A Medical Dilemma, 294 NEw ENG. J. MED. 255 (1976); Borus, Deinstitutionalization
of the ChronicallyMentally Ill, 305 NEw ENG. J. MED. 339 (1981).
10. J. TALBOTT, supra note 7, at 26 (discussing dramatic effects of introduction of autopsychotic
medications on institutional psychiatry); see generally J. SWAZEY, CHLORPROMAZINE IN PSYCHIATRY:
A STUDY OF THERAPEUTIC INNOVATION (1974).

11. "Thorazine," the first of the major tranquilizers, seems to have been named for Thor, the mythological god of thunder. The relation between god and drug was, I believe, as follows: At the time of
Thorazine's introduction electroshock therapy was widely used and constituted the drugs' most formidable competition. The name "Thorazine" suggested that the new drug was related to electroshock
therapy in the way that thunder was related to lightning: a different but equally powerful manifestation
of the same phenomenon despite the absence of any visible electric flash. Interestingly, drug recipients
sometimes drew the same connection, calling the drugs "liquid shock therapy." Sitnick, Major Tranquilizers in Prison: Drug Therapy and the Unconsenting Inmate, 11 WILLAMETTE L.J. 378, 379 n. 10
(1975). The names "Largactil" and "Prolixin," with their obvious overtones of power, speak for
themselves.
12. JOINT COMMISSION ON MENTAL ILLNESS AND HEALTH, ACTION FOR MENTAL HEALTH 39 (1961)

("These [tranquilizing] drugs have revolutionized the management of psychotic patients in American
mental hospitals .... "). J. SWAZEY, supra note 10, at 207-24, describes the remarkable inroads that
drugs had made as early as 1956, less than three years after their introduction.
13. The rate of psychiatric hospitalization in the United States began to decline in 1955 and dropped
even more sharply after 1965. Bassuk & Gerson, supra note 9, at 47-48.
14. Sterling, Ethics and Effectiveness of Psychosurgery, in CONTROVERSY IN PSYCHIATRY 126 (J.
Brady & H. Brodie eds. 1978); see ConstitutionalRights of the Mentaly Ill, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on ConstitutionalRights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,87th Cong., 1st Sess. at 37 (1961)
(statement of Dr. Overholser) (lobotomy had all but disappeared from hospitals because, according to
Dr. Overholser, "[s]ince the tranquilizers came in you can get pretty much the same effect by giving
them these drugs ... "; electroshock "has pretty much gone out" too.) [hereinafter cited as Constitu.
tionalRights of the Mentaly 11].
15. For discussion of the widely noted decline in physical restraint and seclusion, see Goldman, The
Effect of Chlorpromazine on Severe Mental and Emotional Disturbances, in CHLORPROMAZINE AND
MENTAL HEALTH: PROCEEDINGS OF THE SYMPOsIUM HELD UNDER THE AUSPICES OF SMITH, KLINE,

& FRENCH LABORATORIES, JUNE 6, 1955 19, 29 (within 18 months after introduction of drug therapy,
average daily number of patients in restraint on one mental hospital ward declined from I I to 1.5
patients per day) [hereinafter cited as 1955 SYMPosIUM]; see also ConstitutionalRights of the Mentally
ll, supranote 14, at 26-27 (statement of Dr. Overholser) (in early 1960s, St. Elizabeth's Hospital in
Washington D.C. had largely abandoned mechanical restraints and "padded cells"; in cases of patient
dangerousness hospital resorted instead to "what might be termed chemical restraints"); Appleton, The
Snow Phenomenon: Tranquilizingthe Assaultive, 28 PSYCHIATRY 88, 89 (1965) (massive doses of major
tranquilizers given to eight percent of all drug recipients to control assaultive behavior). In the late
1970s many New Jersey mental hospital wards with which I am familiar, including some wards for
highly disturbed patients, had no seclusion rooms at all. The hospitals' reliance on drugs thus was
reflected in its architectual arrangements.
16. Cf Szymanski, Simon & Gutteman, Recoveryfrom SchizophrenicPsychosis, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 335, 336 (1983) (average length of hospitalization 23 days for sample of 44 chronic schizophrenics).

1984]

MENTAL ILLNESS AND DRUGS

1727

cult to remain for any length of time.' 7
The introduction of drugs has had a profound effect on the state institutions
themselves. Private settings such as boarding or nursing homes have replaced
state hospitals as the preferred housing for the mentally ill.18 There has been a
vast reduction in the number of patients at state mental hospitals.' 9 A primary
function of the hospitals is the institution of drug regimens, 20 which will make
the patients acceptable to private custodians. 2 ' Hospitalization generally lasts
the menno longer than is necessary to accomplish that goal. 22 Meanwhile,
23
tally ill live a drugged existence in these private settings.
Despite suggestions to the contrary, the drug regime in psychiatry is not selfevidently preferable to the custodial regime it supplanted. Indeed, despite the
revolution that drugs have wrought in public mental health care, custodydefined as close supervision of the patient and restraints on the patient's freedom of movement-remains the central part of the state psychiatric regime.
Today, custody is different only in the sense that private settings have replaced
public ones, and the restraints used are biological rather than physical. 24
The effects of involuntary drugging go beyond mere custody, however. Potential drug side effects are among the most serious harms that states impose
upon persons protected by the Constitution. Patients forced to take drugs-as
most are 2 5-- can be mentally tormented or physically debilitated by the medi17. Reich & Siegel, The Chronically Mentally Ill Shuffle to Oblivion, in PSYCHIATRISTS AND THE
LEGAL PROCESS: DIAGNOSIS AND DEBATE 264, 266 (R. Bonnie ed. 1977) (as state mental institutions
close, only acutely mentally ill admitted; others turned back to community).
18. "Community" treatment and housing of the mentally ill are currently widely preferred to all
forms of hospitalization. Moreover, the resulting "community" treatment settings and residences are, in
general, privately rather than state operated. See generaly JOINT COMMISSION ON MENTAL ILLNESS &
HEALTH, ACTION FOR MENTAL HEALTH (1961); A. SCULL, DECARCERATION: COMMUNITY TREATMENT AND THE DEVIANT-A RADICAL VIEW (1977); J. TALBOTT, THE DEATH OF THE ASYLUM (1978);

Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally I//. PracticalGuides and ConstitutionalImperatives, 70 MICH. L. REv. 1108 (1972); Rhoden, The Limits of Liberty: Deinstitutionalization,Homelessness and Libertarian Theory, 31 EMORY L.J. 375 (1982).
19. The number of patients in American state mental hospitals has decreased from a high of 559,000
patients in 1955 to 138,000 in 1980. Goldman, Taube, Regier & Witkin, The Multiple Functionsofthe
State Mental Hospital, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 296, 298 (1983).
20. See Crane, ClinicalPsychopharmacologyin Its Twentieth Year, 181 SCIENCE 124, 125 (1973) (one
study reported that 85% of hospitalized schizophrenics receive drugs at any given time); Geller, State
HospitalPatientsand Their Medication-Do They Know What They Take, 139 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 611,
612-13 (1982) (a study of state mental hospital housing 281 patients showed 262 were receiving drugs;
four more were refusing drugs that had been prescribed); Mason, Nerviano & DeBurger, Patternsof
Antipsychotic Drug Use in Four Southeastern State Hospitals,38 DISEASES OF THE NERVOUS SYSTEM
541, 541 (1977) (drugs prescribed for more than 93% of patients at four state hospitals).
21. Reich & Seigel, supra note 17, at 270 (patients in nursing homes placed under "chemical restraint" by giving them large doses of tranquilizing drugs).
22. Id at 266, 268-70 (patients discharged from hospital into nursing homes, foster homes, shelters,
and proprietary homes).
23. Drugging of the seriously mentally ill in the "community" is all but universal. See, e.g., P.
LERMAN, DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION: A CROSS PROBLEM ANALYSIS 61-62, 64-68 (1981) (76% of former
hospital patients in boarding homes being drugged); Leaf & Holt, How Wyatt Affected Patients, in
WYATT V. STICKNEY, RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT 49, 96 (1981) (approximately 80% of former mental
patients recently discharged from Alabama mental hospital in wake of right to treatment class action
decree were being drugged); see also S. ESTROFF, MAKING IT CRAzY: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF PSYCHIATRIC CLIENTS IN AN AMERICAN COMMUNITY 68-69 (1981) (of 43 chronically mentally ill persons in
"community" program, 35 received drugs on a constant basis).
24. See infra text accompanying notes 112 to 130 (discussing question of whether drugs also cure
mental illness).
25. See supra note 20 (describing percentage of patients taking drugs).
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cations, yet remain mentally ill even with the treatment. 26
As this revolution unfolded, drugs received remarkably little attention from
outside of medical circles. In particular, serious judicial scrutiny of the drugs
came surprisingly late. It was not until the mid- to late-1970s that patients
27
began filing lawsuits claiming that forced medication was unconstitutional.
No federal
court of appeals reached the merits of a drug refusal lawsuit until
1980 2 8-almost thirty years after the drugs' American debut and almost a decade after landmark federal court decisions recognizing a "right to [state mental
hospital] treatment" and the right to trial-like hearings in connection with in29
voluntary state hospital commitment.
The drugging plaintiffs' rhetoric portrayed state mental patients as ordinary
medical clients who had the right to decline medical intervention, 30 but the
26. See infra note 75 to 104 and accompanying text (discussing certain side effects of drugs).
27. See, e.g., Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1976), vacated,458 U.S. 1101 (1982), on remand
691 F.2d 634 (3d Cir. 1982); Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915 (N.D. Ohio 1980); Rogers v. Okin, 478
F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), aff'd in part,rev'd in part,and remanded,634 F,2d 650 (Ist Cir. 1980),
vacatedand remandedsub nom, Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982), laterproceeding,Rogers v. Commissioner Dept. of Mental Health, 390 Mass. 489, 458 N.E.2d 308 (1983); Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp.
1131 (D.N.J. 1978), class injunction issued,476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979), modied, 653 F.2d 836 (3d
Cir. 1981) (en bane), vacated and remanded,458 U.S. 1119 (1982), on remand,720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir.
1983) (en banc); Souder v. McGuire, 423 F. Supp. 830 (M.D. Pa. 1976); Goedecke v. State Dept. of
Inst., 198 Colo. 407, 603 P.2d 123 (1979) (en banc); In re Boyd, 403 A.2d 744 (D.C. 1979); In re Fussa,
No. 46912 (Minn. Sup. Ct. June 14, 1976), reportedin I MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 332, 456 (1977);
In re B., 156 N.J. Super. 231, 383 A.2d 760 (1977); In re K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1980).
Earlier cases raising constitutional challenges to involuntary civil commitment involved drugs tangentially. See Bell v. Wayne County Gen. Hosp. at Eloise, 384 F. Supp. 1085, 1100 (E.D. Mich. 1974);
Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1978, 1103 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded,414 U.S. 473
(1974); see also A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 53 (1975) (discussing
Lessard and permissible limits of pre-commitment hearing medication). Because the issue in these
cases was whether any nontrivial treatment could be forced on patients in advance of a commitment
hearing, no serious inquiry into the drugs' attributes was required or made in these cases. A still earlier
case, Winters v. Miler, 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1971) cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971), upheld the right of a
nondangerous, involuntarily committed woman to refuse drugs on religious grounds when she had had
no judicial hearing of any kind in connection with her confinement. Although the Winters opinion
included some fairly sweeping language, it is unclear whether the decision protected patients (1) who
refuse drugs on nonreligious grounds, or (2) who are dangerous, or (3) who receive a prior commitment
hearing.
As early as the late 1960s some prisoners in pro se actions had unsuccessfully challenged forcible
drugging at correctional facilities. See Smith v. Baker, 326 F. Supp. 787 (W.D. Mo. 1970); Peek v,
Ciccone, 288 F. Supp. 329 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
Describing the litigation situation as of 1981, one commentator remarked that "the [judge-made] law
regarding the right to refuse treatment generally, when measured by judicial decisions rather than articles in legal journals, still remains rather sparse." D. WEXLER, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: MAJOR
ISSUES 244 (1981). Since the Supreme Court has never reached the merits of a "right-to-refuse-medication" claim, see Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982), and Rennie v. Klein, 457 U.S. 298 (1982), the
issue remains open.
28. Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 656 (1st Cir. 1980) (absent finding of incompetence, drugs cannot
be forcibly administered solely for treatment purposes); Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939, 945-47 (3d Cir.
1976) (holding only that right to refuse drug claims raise substantial federal questions).
29. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). The landmark right-to-treatment cases are
Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966), and Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp, 781 (M.D. Ala.
1971), afdinpart,reserved in part,and remandedsub nom, Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir.
1979). The landmark challenge to state civil commitment proceedings was Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F.
Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
30. See, e.g., Brief for Respondents, at 46-47, Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982) ("In English and
American jurisprudence individuals have the right to choose between accepting or rejecting medical
treatment recommended to them by a physician"). Indeed, the same point is suggested by the very
name given to these constitutional challenges, which are called "right-to-refuse-treatment" (or "drug"
or "medication") cases. See, e.g., Brooks, The ConstitutionalRight to Refuse Anti-psychotic Medications,
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real import of these cases lay elsewhere. Unlike ordinary medical patients who

can reject any and all medical treatment, state mental patients can be involuntarily confined or restrained if they refuse drug treatments. Thus, drug-refusal
litigants invite the state not to treat them as ordinary patients, but rather to
manage them with custodial rather than biological means. Patients who refuse

drug treatment in effect reject the new state psychiatric order, and their right to
do so is the central issue in "right to refuse drugs" cases.
Drug refusal therefore runs counter to the basic programmatic tenets of contemporary state psychiatry in every way. Since private boarding facilities are
unlikely to accept someone who is not being drugged, the patient who refuses
drugs will remain a public charge. The patient must remain in a secure hospital setting, despite state psychiatry's presumption against prolonged hospitalization. In addition, when drugs cannot be used to manage threatening
behavior, the disfavored techniques of physical restraint and seclusion must be
employed.
Confronted by drug lawsuits, with their implied challenge to the current
drug regime, courts generally have agreed that mental patients enjoy a constitutionally protected right to refuse drugs and that states can override this right
under certain conditions.3 ' The difficult question has been whether to charac-

terize those conditions, and thus to delineate the scope of the patients' rights,
by using medical or legal constructs. A medical characterization, for example,

would allow the state to override drug refusals whenever such action was medically necessary in the state's "professional" judgment. 32 A legal characteriza-

tion, by contrast, would employ no medical standards. Involuntary drugging
might be barred, for example, unless the state had a "compelling reason" and

no "less restrictive alternative" to drugging33-familiar

legal concepts foreign

to medical decision-making. Similarly, patients' procedural entitlements in
drug matters could be determined by medical constructs, such as the right to
talk with the treating doctor, 34 or legal constructs, such as the right to an ad-

ministrative hearing35before a lay judge, with attorneys, witnesses, rules of evidence, and the like.
This article explores the medical and legal characterizations of the "right to
refuse drugs." The implications that these characterizations hold for presentday state psychiatry and judicially mandated change also will be explored.
8 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 179 (1980); Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy: Mental
Patients'Right to Refuse Treatment, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 461 (1978); Rhoden, The Right to Refuse Psychotropic Drugs, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 363 (1980); Shavill, Patients'Rightsv. Patients' Needs: The
Right of the Mentally Ill to Refuse Treatment in Colorado, 58 DEN. L.J. 567, 572-74 (1981).
31. See, e.g., Rogers, 634 F.2d at 656 (state may override right to refuse drugs when likelihood of
violence outweighs potential harm to patient or when drugging needed to prevent patients' deterioration); Rennie, 462 F. Supp. at 1145 and 476 F. Supp. at 1308 ( when patient dangerous to others, when
refusal caused by underlying mental condition, when drugs are component of full treatment plan, or
when no alternate treatment available important factors in deciding when state can override right to
refuse drugs); see also infra text accompanying notes 246 to 258.
32. Eg., Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 855 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc) (Seitz, C.J., concurring) (only
"substantial departure from accepted professional judgment" justifies court review).
33. E.g., Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 849 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc); cf Romeo v. Youngberg, 644
F.2d 147, 159-61, 164-66 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc) (state may not physically restrain mentally retarded
adult unless compelling reason or no less restrictive analysis exists), rev'd,457 U.S. 307 (1982).
34. E.g., Rennie, 653 F.2d at 849.
35. E.g., Rennie, 462 F. Supp. at 1147-48; see Shavill, supra note 30, at 590.
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Part I argues that the legitimacy of state drugging must be based on a choice
between "professional" and "political" charters. Both the outcome of constitutional "interest weighing" and the subsequent fashioning of a remedy depend
upon this choice. 36 Part II then examines state drugging in light of the considerations enumerated in Part I. Without suggesting that either choice is compelled, the article argues that there is unprecedented strength in the case for a
political charter, rather than a professional one, in state drugging matters.
Part III turns to the judicial decisions concerning the right to refuse drugs
and examines the seemingly unworkable combinations of legalistic substantive
standards and medical procedures that have appealed to thoughtful courts.
Part IV takes issue with the courts' basic orientation and concludes with a plea
for judicial candor about state drugging of the mentally ill.
I. STATE PROFESSIONALISM AND THE CONSTITUTION

When a state acts in a professional capacity, providing medical, 37 legal, 38 or
36. My approach to this subject differs from others. In general, commentary about the "right to
refuse drugs" has had two aspects. First, either explicitly or implicitly, drugging is allocated to the
medical or political (legal) realms of action, see infra notes 40 to 45 and accompanying text; no matter
which realm is chosen, the choice is usually taken to be self-evident. Second, there is a principled
discussion of the constitutional rights and interests at stake and an analysis of how these should be

balanced or adjusted to accommodate drugging's medical or political nature (depending on which
realm was chosen). See, e.g., Rhoden, supra note 30, at 375 (right to refuse medication founded on
constitutional right to privacy); Comment, Madness and Medicine: The Forcible Administration of
Psychotropic Drugs, 1980 WIs. L. REV. 497, 500, 542 (various autonomy interests may be asserted in
right-to-refuse-drug cases).
I believe that the question of whether drugging is "medical" or "legal" is, in fact, the primary issue.
In my view, however, the answer is not self-evident; rather, the question is arguable, and it deserves all
the analytical care and attention usually devoted to the legal issues. As I argue in Part I, the outcome of
constitutional "balancing" in fact turns on the characterization of drugs as "medical" or "legal."
This approach has its own antecedents and tradition. It is influenced by work on the place of legal
structures and values in nominally medical realms. See, e.g., A. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND THE
MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM

(1974); A.

STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION

(1975); Dershowitz, Psychiatryin the Legal Process: "A Knife That Cuts Both Ways" TRIAL, Feb.-Mar.
1968 at 29. Second, it owes a debt to the view of constitutional law decisions as choices "among alternative allocations of [social] decisionmaking authority . . . , [the] allocation of competences." Tribe,
Foreword- Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1, 11, 13
(1973) (internal emphasis and quotation marks omitted); see generally M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983). I also am influenced by the linkage of constitutional analysis to painstaking attention to
facts about drugging. See DuBose, Of The ParensPatriaeCommitment Power and Drug Treatment of
Schizophrenia: Do the Benefts to the Patient Justify Involuntary TreatmentZ 60 MINN. L. REV. 1149
(1976). While DuBose analyzed drugs' benefits under experimental conditions and deemed the attitude
of a reasonable man toward that experimental data as decisive, I believe that a broader base of facts is
necessary and that DuBose's "reasonable man" apparatus is not strong enough to do the issue justice.
Finally, commentators outside of the law and psychiatry domains have argued, as I shall, that the
"professionalization" of constitutional standards is inexplicable as the outcome of judicial "interest
balancing" and that it reflects something deeper. See Note, Due Process, Due Politicsand Due Respect:
Three Models of Legitimate School Governance, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1106 (1981).
I devote only passing attention to questions of remedy. Brooks, supra note 30, provides a careful
discussion of remedies.
37. In addition to the mental hospital drugging cases, see Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982)
(physical safety, freedom from restraint, and treatment in a state institution for retarded) ; Parham v.
J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (commitment of unwilling children to state hospitals on authority of a parent
or guardian); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (prison doctor's care); O'Connor v. Donaldson,
422 U.S. 563 (1975) (mental hospital confinement and lack of care).
38. Jones v. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. 3308 (1983) (public defender); Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312,
325 (1981) (same).
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educational3 9 services, for example, its authority can be controlled either by
professional norms and practices or by political processes. Characterization of
the state's performance as political or professional provides the means by
which the state's power over its citizens is rationalized and controlled.
This characterization is more than a matter of rhetoric; it involves deciding
'40 This
the basic forms of social legitimacy for the state's action-its "charter.
choice, in turn, determines the standards of practice, goals, and methods of
decision-making by which the activity will be judged. Accordingly, the way in
which an activity is characterized often will determine the outcome of a constitutional challenge to that activity.
Political and professional charters differ tremendously: one regulates the relationship of professionals to their clients via professional standards; the other
controls officials' relationships to citizens via legal rights and duties. The professional world is goal oriented, and its charter must therefore accommodate
single-minded individuals striving toward professional objectives such as medical cures. By contrast, the political world is process oriented; its political charter must preserve the rights4 1 of individuals as they pursue diffuse, and
sometimes inconsistent, ends.
The elements of these two charters are not fungible. Any intermingling of
their elements risks distortion and the creation of social forms, which are
neither recognizably professional nor tolerably political in nature. Moreover,
the choice of one charter threatens values that the other charter is designed to
advance: applying a political charter impels state-professional activity in unprofessional directions, while applying a professional charter entails sacrifice
of legal or constitutional structures.
A. FORCED DRUGGING: A CASE IN POINT

Forced state hospital drugging, a classic case of state professionalism, illustrates these problems. To recognize a right to refuse drugs is to acknowledge
legal limits on a state's power to impose potentially harmful biological interventions on its citizens. The kind of substantive and procedural constraints
imposed on politically chartered activities, however, simply do not comport
with the professional aspects of state hospital drugging. When mental patients
avail themselves of trial-type hearings in drug matters or refuse drugs altogether, the nature of the psychiatrist-patient relation changes. That relation
must be affected when doctors and patients stand as equals and dispute therapeutic issues before third-party judges-as a political charter would mandate.
Moreover, if drug refusal is permitted, the doctor-patient relationship is not
dissolved, as it would be in most medical settings. Instead, the patient, whose
lack of judgment about psychiatric care presumably contributed to his involuntary commitment, is empowered to dictate to the doctor charged with his
39. Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978) (state-funded professional school); Ingraham
v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (public schools); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (same).
40. The use of the word "charter" in this article is a loose adaptation of a usage in social anthropology, which itself is probably derived from legal concepts like "corporate charter." See generally B.
MALINOWSKI, A SCIENTIFIC THEORY OF CULTURE AND OTHER ESSAYS 48, 52-53 (1944).
41. For discussion of the diversity of goals in political realms, see generally J.RAwLs, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE (1971).
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care. The doctor, in turn, must abandon what he or she regards as the preferred treatment-drugs-in favor of what are deemed to be less effective
treatments or primitive custodial measures. The basic organization of the public mental health system is threatened and, in theory at least, state hospitals
face the 42prospect of being overwhelmed with undruggable, unmanageable
patients.
At the same time, the license granted by a professional charter cannot comport with any view of forced drugging as a political instrument that advances a
legitimate public purpose, subject to constraints designed to protect individual
rights. For example, some judges override the patient's right to refuse drugs
whenever the hospital's decision is recognizably "professional" in nature; 43 the
same judges reduce procedural due process to an opportunity for the patient to
speak with a doctor. 44 As a result, the right to refuse treatment is transformed
into a right to receive "professional" treatment;45 a substantive constitutional
liberty right becomes no more than an entitlement to a professional judgment
concerning one's biological or medical well-being; and the constitutional guarantee of due process is deemed satisfied by whatever medical judgment happens to be recognized in the psychiatric science of the day.
This conflict is not necessarily between purity of constitutional reasoning on
the one hand and drug refusers' health on the other. Mental patients, like
others, have an interest not only in fair treatment, but also in avoiding harmful
biological impositions. Moreover, incremental improvements in mental health
may not be the patients' primary life goal, especially if the improvement is
slight and the cost in individual dignity and physical integrity is high. Nor can
one assume that state psychiatry's judgments about individual well-beingabout therapeutic benefit and risk-are inevitably sound or deserving of social
acquiescence.
Either professional or political values must be sacrificed in such a controversy over state professionalism. One can attempt to minimize the sacrifice,
but given the incompatibility of professional and political charters, some substantial sacrifice is generally unavoidable. The difficult task is choosing which
principal values to sacrifice.
B. STATE PROFESSIONALISM AND BALANCING OF INTERESTS

1. Characterization is Determinative of the Balancing Process
Courts do not resolve the conflicts posed by state professionalism simply by
42. See Shavill, supranote 30, at 602-04 (right to refuse drugs will result in sicker patients, longer
hospitalizations, and demoralized doctors); Stone, Recent Mental Health Litigation: A CriticalPerspective, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 273, 278 (1977) (right to refuse drugs will cause "serious harm to both
patients and staff... reversing 200 years of progress and transforming the 20th century dream of the
mental health center into the 18th century nightmare of bedlam.")
43. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
44. See, e.g., Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d at 850-52 (judges' role limited to reviewing hospital regulations to ensure they satisfy constitutional standards); Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d at 657 (court's role
limited to designing procedures which ensure that qualified physician considers patients' interests).
45. See Stone, The Right to Refuse Treatment: Why PsychiatristsShould and Can Make It Work, 38
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 358, 360 (1981) (discussing judicial remedy that "transforms the right to
refuse treatment into a right to make sure one is getting proper and necessary treatment"); see generally

T. SZASz,

PSYCHIATRIC SLAVERY: THE DILEMMAS OF INVOLUNTARY PSYCHIATRY AS EXEMPLIFIED BY
THE CASE OF KENNETH DONALDSON (1977).
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weighing and balancing individual and public interests. Before balancing
these interests, courts either consciously or, more often, unconsciously characterize the challenged state action in political or professional
terms; that is, they
46
choose the appropriate charter for that activity.
The Supreme Court has wrestled with this problem in a variety of related
contexts. In Parham v. JR,4 7 for example, minors challenged a state mental
hospital's practice of committing children, based on their parents' signatures
and consent, without a prior hearing. Should the court have politically characterized the plaintiffs as people held involuntarily by the state for treatment
they did not want, or should the court have characterized the plaintiffs in a
professional light-as underage medical clients, no different than children admitted to general hospitals for tonsillectomies by their parents? While both
descriptions are appropriate, the children could not be characterized in both
ways simultaneously, since the question was whether to require an adversarial
hearing before their involuntary admission to the hospital, and the two characterizations lead to contrary conclusions. Similarily, in Ingraham . Wright,48
public school students attacked their teachers' practice of paddling as constitutionally impermissible corporal punishment. Should the physical beating have
been judged politically, as a constitutionally constrained means for states to
pursue legitimate public purposes, or should the paddling have been considered professionally, as a disciplinary tool of educators who just happen to
work in public schools? As these two cases suggest, the characterization of the
state's activity analytically precedes the weighing of constitutionally protected
interests.
To determine what constitutes due process under the fourteenth amendment, courts generally state that they weigh the interests of the affected individual and the government along with the likelihood that enhanced procedures
can contribute to accuracy in fact-finding. 49 The outcome of this process, however, actually will depend on whether the state's activity has been characterized as political or professional.
When the court characterizes an activity such as drugging in professional
terms, the due process balancing formula will reveal a high and benign state
interest (treating mental illness), an individual interest tempered by the affected person's own substantial stake in the realization of professional goals
(medical cure), and a small likelihood that additional procedures invented by
lay judges will improve upon the profession's own methods for achieving suc46. For a similar observation, though somewhat critical and confined to Supreme Court decisions
about schooling, see Note, supra note 36, at 1106-07 ("[T]he standard instrumental approach [i.e. balancing of interests] is effectively abandoned [in the school cases]; reliance . . . [being] placed instead
on intuitive judgments concerning the legitimacy of school governance. . . [T]he instrumental analysis
• . . is not so much flawed by erroneous valuations of the relevant interests as it is simply not applied").
Unlike the author of the note, I regard the abandonment (or, at least, postponement) of balancing as
inevitable, rather than remarkable or deplorable. It also is not obvious that the balancing of interests is
any less "intuitive"-in that author's words--than what I have called the process of characterization.
47. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
48. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
49. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976); c. Note, Specfying The ProceduresRequired
By DueProcess: Toward Limits on the Use of Interest Balancing,88 HARV. L. REv. 1510 (1975) (while
some uncertainty inevitable in balancing, courts' refusals to specify procedures exaggerates inherent

problems).
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cess. The same state action, characterized politically, will produce a dramatically different outcome, although the formula for due process analysis remains
unchanged. Judged in nonprofessional, political terms, the state's action of
forced biological containment will be viewed as an extraordinary measure. Individuals will be viewed as having a substantial interest in resisting such measures, the government's interest in avoiding less extreme alternatives probably
will not be seen as overwhelming, and the necessity for enhanced fact-finding
will be great. The same analysis of characterization applies to the extent that
courts approach issues of substantive
constitutional rights by a similar "weigh50
ing" of competing interests.
The weight of the public and private interests remains relevant, of course. A
mental patient forced to endure group therapy once a week and a mental patient forced to accept immobilizing drug injections administered weekly do not
have the same interest in resisting the hospital's actions. In addition, their respective claims to freedom present different due process issues. The difficult
state professionalism cases, however, pit substantial individual interests against
important state concerns. In these cases-Ingraham,Parham,and the forced
drugging lawsuits, for example-characterization, or the choice of a social
charter, carries decisive importance.
2. Why Balancing is Secondary To Characterization
While characterization is determinative of the balancing process, in our law,
as a matter of social theory or logic, that need not have been so. To the contrary, the choice between professional and political characterization could
have depended on a weighing process in which the court assayed individual
and public interests in political and profession-neutral terms. Were that the
case, characterization and constitutional weighing would remain linked: characterization would then follow from, rather than precede, the court's analysis
of individual and public "interests." Several considerations, however, compel
the conclusion that courts first characterize an activity and only afterwards
weigh the interests involved.
The Supreme Court's recent state-professionalism opinions suggest the primacy of characterization.5 1 The Justices do not identify or address this precise
question, but they have described the state action being challenged as "medical ' 52 or "educational" 53 in nature and have attached significance to such de50. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. at 320 ("In determining whether a substantive right protected by
the Due Process Clause has been violated, it is necessary to balance 'the liberty of the individual' and
'the demands of organized society'); Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d at 657 (forced drugging issue in its
substantive aspects demands "balancing" of individual and public interests); see generally P. BREST,
PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKINo, 903-1017 (1975).

51. See supranotes 37 to 39; see also Chappell v. Wallace, 103 S. Ct. 2362 (1983) (judicial deference
to professional military judgment).
52. Eg., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. at 608-09 ("What process is constitutionally due cannot be divorced from the nature of the ultimate decision that is being made .... Here the questions are essentially medical in character [the ultimate issue being whether a child may be involuntarily confined to a
state mental hospital without any hearing, based on parental consent] .... Even after a hearing, the
nonspecialist decisionmaker [if any] must make a medical-psychiatric decision").
53. Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 89-90 ("The decision to dismiss respondent
rested on the academic judgment of school officials. . . .Like the decision of an individual professor as
to the proper grade for a student in his course, the determination whether to dismiss a student for
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scriptions. At the same time, the opinions do not suggest that these
descriptions were arrived at through
even a preliminary analysis or weighing
54
of social and individual interests.
In addition, courts have not hesitated to frame state-professionalism rulings
and remedies in professional terms.55 Thus, courts have interpreted the procedural and substantive due process guarantees to require nothing more than
"professional" procedures. 5 6 No profession-neutral calculus of interests, however, could accord so precisely with professional judgment and practice, especially given the range of activities members of a profession can perform while
remaining "recognizably professional." Moreover, tomorrow's "recognizably
professional" actions automatically pass constitutional muster under these legal tests. Courts, however, could not apply any profession-neutral analysis of
interests to these actions without knowing what the future will bring: they
must defer to professionalism as such. Professionalism, therefore, is a basic
element in constitutional analysis which cannot be reduced through further
analysis to public and private "interests." It therefore is clear that in constitutional controversies over state professionalism,
courts both write and think
57
about professionalism as an irreducible entity.
academic reasons requires an expert evaluation of cumulative information and is not readily adapted to
the procedural tools of judicial or administrative decisionmaking").
54. On the other hand, Supreme Court opinions do consider the effects of constitutional decisionmaking on day-to-day professional functioning. To this extent, the Court's characterizations turn on a
form of institutional analysis. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. at 322 ("courts must show
deference to the judgment exercised by a qualified professional [at state mental retardation facility]"
and thereby minimze "interference by the federal judiciary with the internal operations of these institutions"); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. at 682 ("additional administrative safeguards [in connection
with public school corporal punishment] . . . would. . . entail a significant intrusion into an area of
primary educational responsibility"); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. at 583 (formal due process procedures
eschewed because they would destroy "effectiveness" of public school suspensions viewed "as a part of
the teaching process"). This type of analysis does not flow from weighing or balancing individual and
social interests. In terms of the framework adopted in this article, however, the analysis is incomplete
because it does not explain why the impact of a political characterization on professional values and
institutions counts for more than the potential impact of a professional characterization on political
concerns and institutions.
55. E.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 325 (1982) (any professional judgment about physical
restraint and institutional safety satisfies due process); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 608 (1979) (doctor's medical judgment, based on information traditionally relied on by physicians, satisfies constitutional due process); Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d at 855 (Seitz, J., concurring) (urging "substantial
departure from accepted professional judgment" standard in forced drugging cases).
56. E.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. at 613 ("independent medical decisionmaking process, which includes. . .[a] thorough psychiatric investigation" satisfies procedural due process); Goss v. Lopez, 419
U.S. at 583 (in requiring informal "give-and-take" between school disciplinarian and student facing
suspension and in declining to mandate more formal procedures, Court "imposed requirements which
are, if anything, less than [what] a fair-minded principal would impose upon himself to avoid unfair
decisions"); see also Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 90 (1978) (academic dismissal procedures need not be adversarial to satisfy due process).
57. One Supreme Court opinion, Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1926), stands out because the Court saw
no need to characterize state professional activity as either professional or political. The Court allowed
Virginia to forcibly sterilize an institutionalized, retarded woman to prevent her bearing retarded children. In his opinion, Justice Holmes declined to characterize sterilization as a medical activity subject
to a professional charter. Id at 203-05. Rather, Justice Holmes accepted biological alteration as a
legitimate political device, and thereby implied that judges and legislatures could make legal judgments
in such extraordinary realms as compulsory sterilization without recourse to professional norms or
considerations. Sterilization arguably is an acceptable measure under a professional charter, yet it is an
unfathomable anomaly under a political one. Holmes refused to recognize the distinction.
Indeed, Virginia's arguments for a professional characterization of compulsory sterilization--that the
woman was incompetent and the operation would speed her release from the institution, id at 203-05-
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C. "DISCOVERING" CHARACTERIZATIONS

Political and professional characterizations are not easy to make, describe,
or defend. Perhaps as a result, courts usually construct state-professionalism
opinions as though no choice at all were involved.
When a court describes some exercise of state psychiatric power as a "medical decision" for example, it may style its pronouncement as a factual discovery rather than a legal decision-as though "medicalness" inhered in the
situation itself.58 Courts that "discover" characterization in this manner ignore
the alternative characterization. 59 They also ignore the fact that, depending on
the context, the very same exercise of state power may be characterized
in one
60
case as legal or political and, in another case, as medical.
Much of the medical and legal debate over forced drugging stalls at the
point of characterization.
One side insists that forced drugging is a self-evident
"medical" prerogative, 6' while the other side just as confidently contends it is a
self-evident political measure, which should be subjected to legal rules.62 The
proponents of a medical charter base their characterization upon a portrayal of
drugs as medical therapy and of state hospitals as medical settings. Proponents
of a political charter, on the other hand, picture drugs as instruments of state
action and draw the appropriate conclusions. These views are mirror images
are echoed in today's forced drugging cases. See, e.g., Brief of the American Psychiatric Association at
25-26, Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836 (3d. Cir. 1982) (failure to impose treatment "irresponsible" when
patients' objections "senseless"); Shavill, supra note 30, at 602 (failure to impose drug treatment over
patients' refusals results in increased length of hospitalization due to ineffectiveness of other treatments).
Buck v. Bell probably would be decided-or rationalized-differently today. See, e.g., In re Grady,
85 N.J. 235, 262 n.8, 426 A.2d 467, 481 n.8 (1981) (decision to allow sterilization of mentally retarded
adult based only on best interests of incompetent, not convenience of society).
58. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. at 609, 613 (questions essentially medical in character; independent
medical decision-making process appropriate to make necessary decisions); cf.Chappell v. Wallace, 103
S. Ct. 2362, 2367 (1983) (courts should defer to professional military judgments).
59. See supra note 52 to 53 (discussing Supreme Court cases describing state action as medical or
educational in nature).
60. Compare Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 609 (1979) (parent's decision to place child in a state
hospital medical in nature and demands only careful medical examination) and Addington v. Texas,
441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979) ("clear and convincing" evidence required in proceeding to commit an adult to
state mental hospital) with Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 495 (1980) (adversary hearings required before
prison inmate transferred to state psychiatric facility, although question "essentially medical"). See
also Chappell v. Wallace, 103 S. Ct. 2362, 2366 (1983) ("The complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the composition, training, equipping, and control of a military force are essentially professional military judgments, subject alwaysto civilian control of the Legislative and Executive Branches")
(quoting Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973)) (emphasis in original). Thus, in Chappell, the
judgments were "professional" for purposes of judicial scrutiny and "political" for purposes of executive and legislative control.
61. See, e.g., Appelbaum & Gutheil, 'Rotting with Their Rights On Constitutional Theory and
ClinicalRealityin DrugRefusal By PsychiatricPatients,7 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 306, 315
(1979) (legal arguments supporting right to refuse medication do not fit with clinical reality); Armstrong, The Use of PsychotropicDrugs in State Hospitals: A Legal or Medical Decision?,29 Hosp. &
COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 118, 118 (legal constraints have "usurped" physicians' authority to make
medical decisions); Comey, Patients' Rights: Too Much Courting, Not Enough Carinp in REFUSINO
TREATMENT, supranote 7, at 49, 50 (psychiatric treatment essential ingredient in hospitalization; decision to commit patient involuntarily should overcome any right to refuse medication).
62. See, e.g., Cole, Patients'Rightsvs. Doctors'Rights: Which Should Take Precedence?,in REFUSINo
TREATMENT, supranote 7, at 56, 67 ("right to refuse treatment" cases must be analyzed within context
of constitutional and common law principles concerning individual's privacy rights); Plotkin, supranote
30, at 463 (as long as public not endangered, individual retains ultimate power to make health
decisions).
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of each other, equally rigid and doctrinaire. 63 Neither side acknowledges that

both the medical and political characterizations are plausible 64 and that what
is needed is a principled way of choosing between the two.
D. CHOOSING BETWEEN THE PROFESSIONAL AND POLITICAL
CHARACTERIZATION: SIX FACTORS

Since the political and professional realms cannot be reduced to a single
universe of interest, an intricate, comparative analysis is unavoidable in stateprofessionalism cases. The professional characterization's cost to political val-

ues must be measured against the political characterization's cost of professional accomplishment. As courts approach the question of characterization,
they must consider a number of factors in determining whether to choose one
characterization over the other. No single factor is determinative; rather, as

will be seen in the following discussion, the factors' relation to each other varies with the particular practice considered.
65
1. Utilitarian and Means Considerations

When characterizing a practice, two important considerations are its overall
contribution to human well-being (whether for good or ill) and the way it
63. The very language judicial opinions use to describe drugs has become stylized. Opinions adopting a political characterization describe drug actions using nonmedical terminology that emphasizes the
chemicals' similarity to classical deprivations of liberty. These courts write of the drugs' "behavior
modifying capacity," Goedecke v. State Dept. of Inst., 198 Colo. 407, 603 P.2d 123, 126 (1979) (en
banc); term them "chemical restraints," Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hosp., 612 F.2d 84,
108 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc), rep'dandremanded,451 U.S. 1 (1981), on remand,673 F.2d 647 (3d Cir.
1982), rev'don othergrounds, 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984) ; and either attach the label "major tranquilizer," In
re K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747, 748 (Okla. 1980); or use other nonmedical expressions, such as "powerful,"
Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 166 n.43 (3d Cir. 1980) (en banc), rev'd 457 U.S. 307 (1982), to
underscore the drugs' potential for drastic action.
Opinions adopting a professional characterization take the opposite approach. Using language overladen with medical and curative connotations, these opinions describe the drugs as "treatment," Rennie,
653 F.2d at 844; and label them "antipsychotics," id at 839 n.2, a term that underscores their medical,
putatively curative nature.
Rhetorical stylization is not objectionable in itself: drugs have to be described in some way. Stylization, however, cannot substitute for a considered choice between the political and professional charters
for forced drugging. The problem will not be moved closer to a solution if drugs are pictured as selfevident instruments of cure or depicted as obvious behavior-modifying biological restraints.
The first Rennie district court opinion, 462 F. Supp. 1131, is a notable exception to these generalizations. It described drugs as curative, id at 1136-37, but nonetheless characterized them politically.
Interestingly, the judge used the terms "major tranquilizer," id at 1136, and "antipsychotic," id at
1138, but generally settled on a neutral term--"psychotropie"--to describe the drugs. Id at 1137.
64. Of course, there is sizable literature presuming that one solution will advance medical and political (or constitutional) values alike and thus that neither set of values need be sacrificed. Indeed, one
argues for that unique solution by pointing out how alternative measures impair either legal or political
concerns. The possibility of such a uniquely satisfactory solution appears, however, to be small-particularly in the drug cases. See infra notes 75 to 121 and accompanying text (discussing effects of
drugs). For an example of this viewpoint, see Brotman, BehindtheBench in Rennie v. Klein, in REFUSING TREATMENT, supra note 7, at 31, 40-41 (District Court Judge Brotman, reflecting on decision in
Rennie, noted that ruling was compromise that would hopefully satisfy patient advocates and medical
profession alike; and hoped that decision would "spur the reforms that are so badly needed" and would
produce "better patient care to satisfy the demands of society"). For further discussion of Judge Brotman's ruling, see infratext accompanying notes 275 to 293. See also Brooks, supranote 30, at 216 ("The
medications refusal dialogue between psychiatrists and lawyers should. . . concentrate. . . on ways in
which the two professions can join forces to solve the intricate and complex problems that confront
both.")
65. The term "utilitarian" is used loosely; for example, it does not imply that large numbers of
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makes its contribution. 66 Difficult questions arise, since the issues involved are
often technical and the determination of the amount of "good" accomplished
can be intertwined with professional judgment.
There is a strong temptation to accept a professional characterization when
considering the contribution of a particular practice. It is natural to assume
that professionals would not prescribe treatments that generally are harmful.
Moreover, the treatment's very adoption would make it prima facie professional. Nonetheless, where the practice promises to accomplish little, or if the
treatment requires no professional judgment or expertise,
the case for a profes67
sional characterization is weakened considerably.
2. Self-Characterization
The institution's own performance can serve to characterize itself. Some
missteps bespeak political overreaching, while others are the result of unintentional carelessness, human fallibility, or lack of knowledge. An institution's
attempts to correct its errors and its relations with the people subject to it are
elements of self-characterization. If single institutional episodes are hard to
characterize in these terms, institutions-like people-can also
reveal their
68
true nature over the course of years; thus, history is important.
A mismatch between judicial characterization of an institution and the institution's self-characterization can reduce court decrees to futility-or worse.
Political characterization by judges leads to the fashioning of constitutional
rights in a way calculated to remedy and deter state overreaching. If the institution's mistakes do not have that character, judicial decisions will be heavyhanded and needlessly destructive of the good accomplished by the institution.
Similarly, professional characterization by the courts produces a version of
constitutional rights that is deferential in the face of scientific uncertainty and
that is designed to address only occasional, flagrant lapses in institutional performance. Thus, if an institution is following the classical forms of state overreaching, the professional characterization will not respond to the wrong. As a
result, the characterization can accomplish nothing, or it may exacerbate the
wrong by lending constitutional sanction to the action.
3. The Relevant Profession's Performance
Looking beyond a particular professional practice, a third consideration
turns on the status and performance of the relevant profession itself. When the
profession's promise of social benefit is in question, whether the profession is
individuals deriving small benefits from drugs necessarily count for more than a small number of
individuals suffering greatly.
66. While these two related factors are obviously relevant, I do not believe they are decisive in any
class of cases. Other factors can outweigh them. Compare DuBose, supranote 36, at 1153-57 (determinative factors are likelihood of improvement, scope of improvement, and dangers involved in treating
or not treating). For further discussion of this point, see infra text accompanying notes 75 to 130.
67. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (failure of national juvenile justice system's discretionary
components to rehabilitate youngsters and system's weak claim on professional status led Supreme
Court to impose political charter, in form of procedural regularity mandated by due process, on state
juvenile courts.)
68. For further discussion of self-characterization, see infra text accompanying notes 131 to 187.
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usually as good as its word becomes important. 69
4. Traditional Allocations of Social Power
The fourth consideration is the traditional allocation of social power between professionalism and politics with respect to the practice or institution in
question. Each culture and era will have made a decision on 70this question and
the courts must either reckon with or defer to that decision.
5. Appropriateness
A fifth factor concerns the ability of the practice or institution to operate
under legal (or professional) rules and procedures. While the utilitarian and
means consideration calls upon courts to weigh the institution's contributions
to well-being under present arrangements, this fifth consideration requires
judges to estimate how judicially decreed changes would affect the balance of
good and harm. This allows for recognition of social inertia. Moreover, certain matters that a profession handles badly can be handled in an even worse
fashion if treated as a political problem, for example. In that case, despite a
courts nonetheless might derelatively harmful state professional practice, the
7
fer and choose a professional characterization. '
6. Judicial Limitations
The last two factors mentioned are closely related to the sixth factor: the
limited ability of courts to impose a legal charter on a recalcitrant social arena.
For example, if doctors, legislators, and the public at large regard a practice as
medical in nature, and if it has been traditionally allocated to the medical
resistance and could
domain, a court's contrary conclusion will meet with
72
prove impossible to enforce at any acceptable cost.
E. HOW THE SIX CONSIDERATIONS RELATE TO EACH OTHER

As already noted, none of the six considerations is singularly decisive, and
each has the potential to override the others. For example, a court might defer
to lackluster professionalism, overriding the first (and third) considerations, if
the problem seemed intractable and social acceptance of a political characterization was doubtful (factors four, five, and six). Yet neither the intractability
of the problem nor the popular feeling that courts should stay their hand
should prevent political characterizations when the institution's overreaching
is serious.
69. For further discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 190 to 199.
70. For further discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 200 to 206.
71. See infratext accompanying notes 207 to 210 (discussing problems associated with judicial intervention); see also Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution:InstitutionalRemedies and JudicialLegitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 691 (1982) ("Because of the intractable nature of questions concerning
treatment for mental patients, the Court may conclude that constitutional rules of liability are ill-suited
to define and protect whatever non-procedural interests the mentally ill and retarded may have. ...
[T]he importance the Court attaches to mental patients' needs does not outweigh the cost to the legiti-

macy of the judicial process necessarily entailed in enforcing such a right.")
72. See infra text accompanying notes 211 to 216 (discussing costs of political characterization as
constraint of judicial power).
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The fourth factor, consideration of tradition, can be powerful, but allocation
of functions between the professional and political realms change over time.
Thus, the traditional allocation, standing alone, can hardly be decisive. Indeed, the advent of state mental hospitals was the culmination of a movement
to allocate insanity to the professional rather than the political domain. 73 The
second factor, self-characterization, also is not decisive. The underlying social
problem can prove resistant to any kind of realistic remedy. As a result, there
would be no pressing need to match the true character of the wrong (selfcharacterization) with an appropriate remedy. Moreover, an institution's selfcharacterization, as discerned by judges, can vary radically from consensus
views-a circumstance that should give courts pause. Courts can draw the
wrong conclusions about self-characterization if they are exposed to inaccurate, incomplete, or misleading trial presentations of the relevant facts. Even
judges confident about their conclusions must consider whether any judicial
remedy can be effective in the face of a social and institutional resistance; thus,
the sixth factor can override the second.
II.

THE PROPER CONSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERIZATION
OF FORCED DRUGGING
A. UTILITARIAN AND MEANS CONSIDERATIONS

Have major tranquilizers proved to be a valuable contribution to the treatment of mental illness? If one answers positively, the case for a professional
characterization seems strong. A negative response, on the other hand, calls
into question our reliance on professional judgments about the drugs. The first
inquiry then must be the utility of the drugs themselves, and the method by
which that utility---or disutility-is achieved.
The question of the drugs' contribution raises three issues. First, whether
and to what extent the drugs increase the patients' well-being? Given the potential for serious drug side effects, 74 a null or minimal contribution substantially weakens the case for a professional characterization.
Second, if the drugs do contribute to patient well-being, is that contribution
peculiarly medical? Some measures, such as regular diet, absence of physical
abuse, clean surroundings, and simple human kindness, may be therapeutic
but may not be properly considered as a uniquely medical treatment. While
the professional characterization of drugging is enhanced if drugs are truly
medical or "antipsychotic" measures, the argument is diminished if drugs are
simply chemical restraints, their therapeutic value deriving from their power to
restrain or benumb.
Third, what role do the drugs play in state psychiatry? If the drugs are truly
antipsychotic, the consequent reduction in mental illness would explain why
73. G. GROB, supranote 2, at 10 ("Virtually none of the legislation enacted by colonial legislatures
[in the 18th century] referred to the medical treatment of the insane; it emphasized mainly the social
and economic side of mental illness"); see also Dershowitz, The Origins of Preventive Conftnement in
Anglo-American Law-PartII: The American Experience, 43 CIN. L. REv. 781, 788 (1974) (until 19th
century, confinement ofmentally ill preventive, not curative or therapeutic). For discussion of the shift
to professionalism, see D. ROTHMAN, supra note 2, at 109-54.
74. See infra notes 85 to 104 and accompanying text.

1984]

MENTAL ILLNESS AND DRUGS

1741

the number of state-institutionalized, physically restrained patients has decreased. If, however, the drugs are simply a means by which patients can be
transferred from state institutions to private custodial care, no antipsychotic
effects are necessarily achieved, and the need to defer to medical judgment is
considerably weakened. The near-universal use of drugs in state psychiatry
raises a presumption that they are beneficial. The true therapeutic effect of the
drugs can indicate, however, that the benefits accrue less to the patients themselves than to those who care for them.
1. Positive Drug Effects
Drug treatment clearly benefits many patients by minimizing or even eliminating psychotic symptoms such as hallucination or catatonic posturing.7 5 Patients who used to hear voices no longer hear them, for example, or the
urgency of the voices diminishes. 76 This benefit lasts only as long as the patients continue to take the drugs, and the drugs on occasion can actually induce hallucinations. 77 Even so, drugs minimize psychotic symptoms often
enough that they are called "antipsychotics." 78 Drugging can also lengthen
the interval between psychotic relapses, so that drugged patients are hospitalized, on average, less frequently than are those who are drug-free. Moreover,
drugging can reduce the duration of psychotic episodes, as measured by the
length of hospitalization.
According to empirical studies, the effect of the drugs on the length and
frequency of hospitalization is statistically significant. One study, for example,
found that over a three-year period, drugged patients were hospitalized on average about 200 days while drug-free patients were hospitalized on average
300 days.79 It is estimated that eighty percent of undrugged schizophrenics
and fifty percent of drugged schizophrenics will suffer relapses and require
rehospitalization within two years.80 These figures demonstrate that drugs,
though far from being a panacea, are effective.
It is easy, however, to read too much into studies that document the drugs'
effectiveness. The numbers, figures, and comparisons largely concern rehospitalization rates, 8 1 but do not measure the drugs' effectiveness against the
75. See Comment, supra note 36, at 512 (psychotropic drugs used to counter delusions and
hallucinations).

76. Id
77. See Van Putten, Mutalipassi & Malkin, PhenothiazineInduced Decompensation, 30 ARCHIVES
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 102, 102 (1974) (describing drug-induced hallucinations).
78. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, TARDIVE DYSIUNESIA: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON
LATE NEUROLOGICAL EFFECTS OF ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUGS 2 (1979) (while these drugs do calm agi-

tated or manic behavior, they are not simply sedatives, and older term "tranquilizers" is misnomer).
79. May, Tuma, Yale, Potepan & Dixon, Schizophrenia-A Follow-up Study of Results of Treatment,

33

ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 481, 482 (1976).
80. Hogarth, Goldberg, Schooler, Ulrich & the Collaborative Study Group, Drug and Sociotherapy

in the Aftercareof SchizophrenicPatientsIf

Two- Year Relapse Rates, 31 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY

603, 605 (1974).
Over periods shorter than two years, however, the advantage of drugs over nondrug treatment is
more pronounced. One study estimated that after one year, 40% of drugged patients relapse compared
to 70% of the nondrugged. Hogarty, Schooler, Urich, Mussare, Ferro & Herron, Fuphenazine and
Social Therapy in the Aftercare of Schizophrenic Patients, 36 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1283, 1292

(1979).
81. Carpenter, Heinrichs & Hanlon, Methodologic Standards/or Treatment Outcome Research in
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most persistent aspects of mental illness: mental deterioration, inability to
work, and the loss of capacity for human relationships. 82 Moreover, the drugs'
overall contribution to declining relapse rates does not mean that each patient's chance of relapse is diminished. A substantial minority of patients seem
to suffer relapses more frequently because of drugs,83 and leading drug researchers suggest that, in practice, fifty percent
of schizophrenics can derive no
84
actual benefit from continued medication.
2. Irreversible Side Effects of Drugs
"Side effects" are on the opposite side of the drug equation: the unpleasant,
unwanted sequelae of drug taking. Many of these effects disappear when drugs
are discontinued or shortly thereafter; some can persist for some time, however, and can become permanent.
Tardive Dyskinesia.
In recent years, one side effect known as "tardive
dyskinesia," has aroused the most legal interest 85 and medical concern 86 because of its "irreversible" nature. The tongue, mouth, and chin are common
sites of tardive dyskinesia: the tongue sweeps from side to side, the mouth
opens and closes, and the jaw moves in all directions. Fingers, arms, and legs
may display comparable movements; swallowing, speech, or breathing can be
affected as well. The movements are uncontrollable, although their intensity
varies from case to case. In severe cases, the involuntary movements impede
walking and even digestion. Health can be endangered, and often the victim's
appearance becomes grotesque.87 Tardive dyskinesia is common: estimates of
the disorder's prevalance rates (the proportion of patients with tardive dysSchizophrenia, 138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 465, 468 (1981) (vast majority of treatment outcome studies

focus exclusively on relapse rates).
82. Carpenter, McGlashon, & Strauss, The Treatment of Acute Schizophrenia Without Dru's: An
Investigation of Some CurrentAssumptions, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 14, 15 (1977); (rehospitalization
rates do not adequately reflect social functioning); Rifkin, Quitkin, Rabiner & Klein, Fluphenazine
Decanoate,Fluphenazine Hydrochloride Given Orally and Placebo in Remitted Schizophrenics: Relapse
RatesAfter One Year, 34 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 43, 44 (1977) (drugs have only proven effective

in preventing severe psychotic symptoms, such as delusions and hallucinations; the quality of patients'
lives can remain miserable despite drugging).
83. Kurucz & Fallon, Dose Reduction and Discontinuationof Antipsychotic Medication,31 HosP. &
COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 117 (1980).

84. Gardos & Cole, MaintenanceAntpsychotic Therapy: Is the Cure Worse Than the Disease?, 133
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 32, 34 (1976); see also Kurucz & Fallon, Dose Reduction and Discontinuation of
Ant~vsychotic Medication, 31 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 117, 119 (1980) (7% of schizophrenic
in-patients whose drug therapy discontinued showed improvement within 90 days); Marder, von Kommen, Docherty, Rainer & Bunney, PredictingDrug Free Improvement in Schizophrenic Psychosis 36
ARCHIVES GEN PSYCHIATRY 1080, 1080 (1979) (8 of 22 psychotic schizophrenic patients improved sub-

stantially during 30-day drug-free period); May, Van Putten & Yale, Predicting Outcome of Antd.
psychotic Drug Treatment From EarlyResponse, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1088, 1088 (substantial number
of schizophrenics do just as well after drug therapy discontinued).
85. See, e.g., Rennie, 653 F.2d at 843 (referring to tardive dyskinesia as drug treatments' "most serious" side effect); Brooks, supra note 30, at 185 (incidence of tardive dyskinesia clearly high enough to
warrant legal, protective action).
86. See, e.g., AMERICAN PSYCHIATIC AssociATIoNq, supra note 78, at 2 (tardive dyskinesia now
recognized as general public health problem of major proportions); Gardos & Cole, Overview: Public
Health Issues in Tardive Dyskinesia, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 776, 776 (1980) (response of medical profession to tardive dyskinesia has shifted from "mild concern" to "panic").
87. See generallyAMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, supra note 78, at 23-42; Crane, supra note
20; Klawans, Goetz & Perlik, Tardive Dyskinesia: Review and Update, 137 AM. J. PSYCH-IATRY 900
(1980).
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kinesia at any particular time) range as high as sixty-five percent; fifteen to
twenty percent is a widely accepted estimate.8 8 It can develop after prolonged
drug exposure, normally six months or longer, and usually persists throughout
the patient's lifetime.8 9 There generally is no cure. 90
3. Reversible Side Effects
Reversible drug side effects generate much less concern than does tardive
dyskinesia. The distinction between reversible and irreversible side effects,
however, is academic to patients who are constantly maintained on drugs,
since many suffer as long as the drugs are administered and it is irrelevant that
their suffering would abate if they could stop taking the drugs.9 1
Akathesia.
One common "reversible" side effect, for example, that is
persistent and very hard to live with is called "akathesia," which is
a subjective state and refers not to any particular type or pattern of
movement, but rather to a subjective need or desire to move. This
urge to move is always accompanied by affective distress and, objectively, is usually manifested by restless pacing, inability to sit still,
fidgetiness and continuous alternations in posture. With the subtle
akathisias, the patient may not pace or use the word 'restless,' and
complain instead of 'nervousness,' 'irritability,' 'impatience,'
'feeling
92
keyed up,' or of an 'inability to feel comfortable.'
88. See e.g., AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, supra note 78, at 43-44; Gardos & Cole, supra
note 86, at 776.
There are reports of irreversible drug side effects other than tardive dyskinesia. For example, one
study has found that prolonged drug administration induces a permanent, paranoid form of psychosis,
which is associated with tardive dyskinesia-like physical symptoms. Chouinard & Jones, NeurolepticInducedSupersensitivityPsychosis. ClinicalandPharmacologicCharacteristics,137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
16, 16 (1980). Another has found that drug-induced Parkinsonism, which symptoms include tremor
and a masked facial expression, becomes permanent as well. Transcript of Testimony, Vol. XVII at 1920, Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979) (testimony of Dr. George Crane).
89. Jeste & Wyatt, Tardive Dyskinesia: A Review ofthe TreatmentPossibilities,10 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 26, 37 (1980). This study noted, however, that perhaps a third of the cases might reverse themselves if the drugs were withdrawn.
90. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, supra note 78, at 137-53 (no therapies for tardive dyskinesia have been proven safe and effective).
91. Many "reversible" side effects persist for weeks-and even months-after drug discontinuation.
Hall, Jackson & Swain, Neurotoxic Reactions Resulting From ChlorpromazineAdministration, 161 J.
A.M.A. 214, 218 (1956) (6 of 90 patients receiving drug therapy showed Parkinson-like neurological
disorders for 60 days or more after drug therapy ceased). It is commonly said that most reversible drug
side effects either abate spontaneously or respond well to anti-Parkinsonian medication. See, e.g., Rennie, 462 F. Supp. at 1138. Many patients find, however, that these side effects persist throughout drug
administration and do not respond to measures short of dose reduction or drug discontinuation. See
Estroff, supra note 23, at 110 ("For our group [of about 40 outpatients] taking meds always meant
developing visible side effects. The shakes, stiffness, blank expression, gait, leg jiggling, eye rolling, and
facial grimacing, were physical markers to others and were badges of patienthood to themselves");
Chouinard, Annable & Ross-Chouinard, Fluphenazine Enanthateand Fluphenazine Decanoate in the
Treatment of Schizophrenic Outpatients. ExtrapyrimidalSymptoms and Therapeutic Effect, 139 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 312, 314 (1982) (despite receiving anti-side effect drugs, about 75% of the patients studied
complained of "reversible" side effects); Shapiro, Shapiro & Wayne, Treatment of Tourett's Syndrome,
28 ARCH vES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 92, 96 (1973) (virtually all patients treated with Haloperidol, a common antipsychotic, develop akinesia); see also Groves & Mandel, The Long Acting Phenothiazines,32
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 893 (1975).
92. Van Putten & Mutalipassi, FluphenazineInanthateInducedDecompensations,16 PSYCHOMATICS
37, 39 (1975).
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Although "anxiety" and "pacing" can seem a small price to pay for freedom
from acute, serious mental illness-a trade, in effect, of psychotic symptoms
for neurotic ones-many patients dislike akathesia intensely and feel they cannot get on with their lives while it rules them.9 3 While drug recipients often
find the symptoms of their own mental illnesses to be "normal" and part of
themselves, they usually perceive akathesia and other side effects as foreign
and objectionable. Moreover, akathesia's symptoms appear odd and patholog94
ical, even in the mental hospital context where odd behavior is not unusual.
Akinesia.
Another common, reversible drug side effect is "akinesia,"
the behavioral and psychological opposite of akathesia. It is manifested by a
reduced capacity for physical or mental spontaneity. Patients display "few
gestures, unspontaneous speech, and particularly, apathy and difficulty initiating usual activities." 95 It is accompanied by a mental state resembling demoralization. Patients speak of being "in a stupor," acting like a "zombie," and
walking around with
a "shuffle, head hung down, looking. . . like [you're] not
' 96
seeing anything.
Distress,Disphoria,and Drug-InducedPsychosis.
Some patients endure
drug-induced mental states far worse than the demoralization of akinesia. For
these people, drugs are the most painful, distressing ordeal they have ever experienced-in
a different class than prolonged solitary confinement or physical
97
deprivation.
93. Id; Van Putten, Mutalipassi & Malkin, Phenothiazine-InducedDecompensation,supra note 77, at
105 (1974).
94. One mental patient, being deposed in the Rennie lawsuit, recalled that patients:
"march back and forth in the coldest weather. . . you see people out there in State clothes
with odd shoes or ... sock, just socks .
Q. These people march back and forth?
A. "They pace back and forth as if in a cell."
Q. You think that has to do with the drugs?
A. "It certainly does because why would they do it unless-it's not normal."
Joint Appendix 69b-70b, Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 386 (3d Cir. 1981).
95. Rifkin, Quitkin & Klein, Akinesia: .4 Poorly Recognized Drug-InducedExtrapyramidalBehavioralDisorder,32 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 672, 672 (1975).
96. Joint Appendix, supra note 94, at 66b.
97. See, e.g., Opton, Psychiatric Violence .4gainstPrisoners." When Therapy is Punishment, 45 Miss.
L.J. 605, 641 (1974), quoting an interview with a drug recipient:
"There is no other feeling like it. Nothing to relate to, no experience anyone would normally
go through in their life. It affects you mentally and physically and you feel suicidal. The
physical effects are so bad you can't stand it. You get muscle spasms . . . you get lockjaw;
you can't control your tongue; you get leg cramps; you get so tired (as if you've been up three
days in a row) you lie down. But you can't stay down for more than three or four minutes
because your knees begin to ache. . . . Your thoughts are broken, incoherent; you can't hold
a train of thought.for even one minute. You're talking about one subject and suddenly you're
talking about another. You start to roll a cigarette, drop it, pick up a book, take a shit, forget
to wipe your ass. Your mind is like a slot machine, every wheel spinning a different thought.
Q. What do you mean, you feel suicidal?
A. ". . . The thought of suicide keeps recurring in order to alleviate, once and for all, the
tortuous effects of the drugs."
See also N. MAILER, THE EXECUTIONER'S SONG 328 (1979):

"And they shot me with that foul drug Prolixin and made a zombie out of me for four months.
I was virtually paralyzed. I couldn't stand up without help and when I was raised to my feet
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Such severe distress, like other serious side effects of the drugs, is not uncommon. One study found that ten percent of the mentally ill respond to
drugs with deep dysphoria-depression or profound unhappiness-while another forty percent endure a less intense but similar reaction. 98
There are also reports of drug-induced psychotic episodes, although no psychiatric consensus exists on the extent of this problem. Researchers have
described a group of patients-eleven percent of one sample and in another
sample thirty-five percent of patients taking a particular drug-who underwent
"a sudden and dramatic exacerbation of psychosis, an experience of abject terror" that was drug induced. 99 These episodes, although intense, are regarded
as reversible. °
Pseudo-Parkinsonism.
The drugs commonly cause a form of pseudoParkinsonism, which is marked by retarded muscle movements, "masked" facial expression, body rigidity, and tremor. It causes the shuffling gait that has
become almost the hallmark of drugged patients, although the symptoms are
generally regarded as reversible. 01'
Physical Complications.
Reversible, physical complications are well
documented. Muscle spasms, blurred vision, and dry mouth are common, as is
drug-caused interference with sexual functioning and inhibition of sexual interest. 10 2 More serious physical complications exist, but are comparatively
I'd wonder what the fuck I wanted to stand up for and I'd sit back down. When it was driving
me the worst I went for three weeks without sleep. I just sat on the corner of the bed-I
hallucinated to the edge of insanity .... I lost about 50 pounds. I just couldn't get the food
to my mouth. Getting up to take a piss was a major effort, I dreaded it, it would take me
about 15 to 20 minutes-I couldn't get the pants buttoned.
Id at 405.
The Executioner's Song is described as a "true life novel"; see Babcock, Gary Glmore's Lawyers, 32
STAN. L. REv. 865, 865 (1980). For another discussion of patients' views, see Sitnick, Major Tranquilizers in Prison: Drug Therapy and the Unconsenting Inmate, WILLIAMETTE L.J. 378, 378-79 nn.10, 11

(1975) (prisoners describe Prolixin as "torture" and "punishment" drug); cf.Mikkelson, Detlor & Cohen, School.4voidanceand Social Phobia TriggeredBy Haloperidolin Patients with Tourette's Disorder,

138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1572, 1574 (1981) (a study of nonschizophrenic patients who "experienced an
onset of unprecedented, severe feelings of anxiety" when treated with haloperidol, a commonly used
antipsychotic drug).
A number of prominent research psychiatrists report that drugs impel some patients to attempt suicide, and mental patients have drawn the same conclusion. See, e.g., Alarcon & Carney, Severe Depressive Mood ChangesFollowingSlow Release IntramuscularFluphenazineInjection, BRIT. MED.J. Sept. 6,

1969 at 564 (10 of 124 patients developed severe depression, and 5 patients committed suicide); Joint
Appendix, supra note 94, at 393a (John Rennie testified that the drug Prolixin "increases your depression ...it makes you want to kill yourself'); see also S. ESTROFF,supranote 23, at 105 (side effects of
Prolixin treatment included anxiety, self-doubt, distress, and suicidal thoughts). Other psychiatrists
remain unpersuaded, however, and there are few relevant studies on the relationship between antipsychotic treatment and suicide. It is clear, though, that drugs induce demoralization and extremely
unpleasant subjective states, whether or not patients actually are driven to suicide.
98. Van Putten & May, Subjective Response As a Predictor of Outcome in Pharmacotherapy. The
Consumer Has a Point,35 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 477, 478 (1978).

99. Van Putten, Mutalipassi & Malkin, PhenothiazineInducedDecompensation,supranote 77, at 102;

see also Simpson, Varga & Haber, Psychotic ExacerbationsProducedBy Neuroleptics,37 DiSEASES OF
THE NERVOUS SYSTEM 367, 367-68 (1976) (discussing drug-induced exacerbation of psychosis).

100. The drugs can, however, cause a permanent psychotic condition. See supra note 97.
101. American College of Neuropsychopharmacology-Food and Drug Administration Task Force,
NeurologicalSyndromes Associated with 4nti-Psychotic Drug Use, 4 Special Report,28 ARCHIvEs GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 463, 464 (1973); see supranote 91 (discussing reversibility of pseudo-Parkinsonism).
102. Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d at 945 n.8; Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. at 1138. See also Mitchell &
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rare. 10 3 A very small number of patients are apparently inflicted with a druginduced sudden death syndrome, in which the patient 10becomes
dramatically
4
more psychotic and then, for no apparent reason, dies.
4. Drug Effects Compared to Effects of Other State Professional Measures
Although the drugs' potential for harm is widely acknowledged, few appreciate that the magnitude and incidence of harm place drug treatment in a class
apart from other coercive, extraordinary state measures (with the exception of
the death penalty for crime and the possibility of a military conscriptee's death
in combat) that have been upheld by the Supreme Court.
In Jacobson v. Massachusetts,105 a case sometimes cited to demonstrate that
state psychiatry's interventions are not unprecedentedly severe, 106 the Supreme
Court upheld a statute punishing as a crime the refusal to submit to smallpox
vaccination. Vaccination, however, involves minimal harms when compared
to the harms caused by forced state drugging. Moreover, one could legally
avoid the harms imposed by the Massachusetts statute, 10 7 and the state did not
seek to impose the treatment by direct force.10 8 Even so, Jacobsonupheld the
statute only as applied to someone unable to demonstrate that the vaccination
would harm him. 10 9 By contrast, many mental patients face demonstrable, serious drug-caused harms, and brute force-or the threat of it-is routinely
brought to bear to compel submission.
The early twentieth-century case law upholding compulsory sterilization of
retarded people' 1 0 provides another example of state-coerced, biological interPopkin, Antipsychotic Drug Therapy and Sexual Dysfunction in Men, 139 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 633, 635
(1982) (rate of sexual impairment in drugged men appears to be "fairly high", while next to nothing
known about incidence of problem in women).
103. Shavill, supra note 30, at 584-85 (other serious side effects of antipsychotic drugs include eye
and skin damage, liver disorders, and agranulocytosis).
104. Rennie, 462 F. Supp. at 1138.
These serious physical effects occur infrequently, at least when compared with the drugs' psychological side effects. Some physicians, however, report life-endangering, physical complications of drugs to
be common. A New York City medical examiner, for example, attracted public attention in 1978 when
he charged that these drugs (along with "minor tranquilizers" like Valium) were implicated in "a large
percentage" of mental patient deaths within his jurisdiction. According to this doctor, patients "vomited into their lungs" because drugs interfered with the body mechanisms that normally prevent vomiting. Other patients, he said, died after being "tranquilized to the point where they were unable to feel
dpain that would act as a warning of the presence of severe medical illness," while still others were too
rugged to call attention to their distress. N.Y. Times, July 17, 1978, at Al, col. 1.
Similar conclusions were expressed by a state mental hospital doctor in Rennie. Exhibit 48 (Deposition of Dr. LoPrete), Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1978). This physician headed the
medical services ward at a New Jersey state hospital. According to his testimony, patients at the hospital died because drugs suppressed their gag reflexes, totally benumbed them, or brought on a fatal
pneumonia by interfering with their lung functioning. Furthermore, the physician testified that large
numbers of elderly patients had fallen and injured themselves because of oversedation. Claims such as
these have not been systematically tested, since they originate with practitioners rather than researchers,
and they remain conjectural. Even so, the lack of attention paid such reports is remarkable.
105. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
106. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 586 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
107. Jacobson could have left Massachusetts for a jurisdiction that had no compulsory vaccination
law. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 36.
108. Jacobson was punished by a fine and imprisonment for not accepting a vaccination, but he was
not physically compelled or even ordered to submit to an injection. Id. at 14.
109. Id at 38-39.
110. See supra note 57 (discussing Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1926)).
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vention. Despite harsh edicts, pro-sterilization decisions emphasized the safety
of medical procedures involved, which the courts said carried with them no
appreciable danger of side effects or harm, other than the intended one of incapacitating the reproductive system."' By comparison, modem psychiatric
drugs cause much more serious harms, and their effects range far beyond the
states' avowed purpose in using them. If sterilization or vaccination routinely
made jaws, arms, legs, and hands twitch interminably, or caused demoralization or produced incessant pacing, it is not obvious that those measures would
have been allowed. No matter how one measures drug benefits, the potential
harms of drugs are constitutionally remarkable.
5. How Drugs Work
Although the drugs' harms can be assessed apart from any other consideration, their contribution to a patient's well-being is related to the issue of their
putative "antipsychotic" action. Certain harms can be tolerable if the drugs
promise a net positive benefit by curing mental illness. If the drugs are used
11 2
only for custodial purposes, however, these harms are less acceptable.
Clearly, physical restraint and chemical sedation are not acceptable when their
use results in physical deformity and mental torment. If drugs produce benefits merely by tranquilizing or restraining patients, the risks of side effects can
be intolerable. If, on the other hand, drugs are "antipsychotic," then they belong to the family of medical measures, such as chemotherapy, whose severe
side effects are sometimes an acceptable cost of their beneficial effect.
Drugs are not the first treatment in psychiatry to be described as curative or
"antipsychotic." Indeed, claims for an "antipsychotic" effect have been made
on behalf of every era's commanding psychiatric therapy. Lobotomy, insulin
shock, and, in earlier times, bleeding and purging have all been said to possess
curative effects beyond their immediate result, which was the weakening or
mutilating of the patient until no energy was available for psychotic behavior.' 13 Benjamin Rush presented his nineteeth century invention of the "tranquilizer"-a chair with straps and other gadgets-as a truly medical invention,
possessing curative properties beyond those of simple restraint." ' 4 State
mental hospitals themselves also were thought to be uniquely curative. At
least in theory, the hospitals' location, administrative structure, and architecture supplied an environment replete with social and personal ordering, the
absence of which was deemed to be the cause of mental illness. ' 5
It is difficult to evaluate such claims, or to distinguish, except in crude intuitive ways, between true "antipsychotic" measures and mere palliatives or adjuncts to custody. The physiological causes and concomitants of mental illness
I11. See e.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. at 205 (sterilization involves no medical danger to patient); State
v. Feilen, 70 Wash. 65, 126 P. 75, 77 (1912) (vasectomy less serious than tooth extraction).
112. Cf.DuBose, supra note 36, at 1182-83 (no legitimate state interest in involuntary, forced drugging if purpose only to control internal, nondangerous aspects of patient's condition).
113. See generally Sterling, supra note 14, at 98 (discussing prior procedures thought at time to be
curative, while in fact only debilitative).
114. G. GROB, supranote 2, at 20; A. DEUTSCH, supra note 2, at 79-80 ("tranquilizer" believed to
have curative effect by reducing pulse).
115. D. ROTHMAN, supranote 2, at 133-154.
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remain matters for speculation.' 16 Physiologically, antipsychotic effects cannot
be confidently distinguished from crude measures-such as bleeding, purging,
and, in all probability, lobotomy-which render individuals too weak or preoccupied to attend to their psychotic urgings. On the other hand, it is conceivable that simple physical restraint and unadorned psychiatric hospitalization
do set off brain reactions no less "antipsychotic" in nature than the reaction to
drugs. However, if every such measure--crude restraint, simple housing arrangements, and brain surgery alike--qualifies as "antipsychotic," then that
concept is almost meaningless. In this regard, the fact that psychiatric intervention comes in drug form does not enhance its claim; 1 7 as a class, drugs are
not inherently more plausible pretenders to antipsychotic status than brain surgery, physical manipulation, or therapeutic "talk." ' s
116. A widely held theory states that the drugs block the effects of a brain neurotransmitter and in
that way attack the very causes of mental illness. See Comment, supra note 36, at 498 n.6 (citing
authorities). Recent work, however, has challenged this theory. See Van Kammen, Docherty, Marder,
Rayner & Bunney, Long Term Pimozide Pretreatment Differentiall Affects Behat-ioral Responses to
Dextroamphetaminein Schizophrenia: FurtherExploration ofthe Dopamine Hypothesis of Schizophrenia, 39 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 275, 280 (1982) (research findings seriously question hypothesis of
simple pathogenic involvement of single neurotransmitter). Because it now appears schizophrenia is
not a function of any one brain neurotransmitter, id, it can no longer be said that drugs act on the
"cause" of schizophrenia. Cf AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, supra note 78, at 2 (while drugs
have "real and selective antipsychotic effects" in schizophrenia, they are "rarely, if ever, curative").
117. From at least the 17th century onward, mental illness has been "treated" by drugs such as
hellebore, camphor, asafoetida, opium, hemlock, bromides, and sodium amytal. 1955 SYMPOSIUM,
supra note 15, at 176-78.
118. Even before publication of the article by Van Kammen, Docherty, Marder, Rayner & Bunney,
supranote 116, the relationship between drugs and schizophrenia was always speculative. Moreover,
the effects of the drugs themselves do not necessarily bespeak peculiarly antipsychotic action.
Indeed, in the drugs' early years, many drug enthusiasts, who were closely evaluating the chemicals'
effects on patients, concluded that beneficial drug effects resulted from brain damage, a process rather
like that of lobotomy. See, e.g., 1955 SYMPosIUM, supra note 15, at 72 (discussing and criticizing current theory that drugs represented "chemical lobotomies"); id. at 51 (remarking that drugged patients
develop signs of "basal ganglion dysfunction" which appear to increase along with drugs' psychiatric
effectiveness); see also Deniker, ExperimentalNeurologicalSyndromes and the New Drug Therapies in
Psychiatry, 1 COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHIATRY 92, 100 (1960) (co-discoverer of Thorazine suggests that
drugs' side effects resemble symptoms and sequelae of various forms of brain encephalitis and that "the
somatic disease may be necessary to cure the mental illness"). Apart from such theorizing, many observers were convinced by careful examination of drug-treated patients that these drugs did not affect
the basic symptomatology of schizophrenia:
We have had cases in which there has been a remarkable social improvement [because of
drugs], but our findings are that underneath this the [pathological] ideation and often the
affect, is not fundamentally changed. . . . ITIhere is . . . less overt verbalization of the
psychotic delusions when the patient is on the drug.
1955 SYMPOSIUM, supra note 15, at 94.

Other observers noted that:
There is no question that the patients on phenothiazines changed dramatically in relation to
the on/off drug condition. However, it should be emphasized that the observed changes did
not suggest that the patient was any less schizophrenic. For the most part, it merely meant
that the group exhibited less florid symptomatology. For example, patient R.M. still heard
voices while receiving thioridazine, but he no longer shouted at them or did cartwheels in
response to their commands. In consequence, he appeared to be more "normal," and people
were able to relate to him in a more reasonable fashion. In fact, in R.M.'s case, the drug
plateau was such that he could go out and work for short periods of 'ime while he was on the
drug. Had the drugs been a bit more effective, they might have reduced his bizarre behavior
to a point below the critical threshold, making it possible for his family and the community to
accept him again. The drug enables some patients to function independently of the hospital,
while the bizarre behavior of others is not sufficiently reduced, and they must remain. A third
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The effects of the drugs appear "antipsychotic," but the overall picture is
mixed. Their prophylactic effect against future mental illness, although not
overwhelming statistically, can be impressive. 1 9 Nonetheless, most acute
psychotic episodes abate with or without drugs. Drugs appear to be ineffective
against the progressive mental and social deterioration of schizophrenics.
Many patients seem to derive no benefit from drugging, and the drugs are
often no more than modestly effective at what they do.' 20 Moreover, the drugs
have effects-notably akinesia, which renders patients subdued, compliant,
and unspontaneous-that hardly qualify as antipsychotic, which could explain
the drugs' effectiveness. Arguably, the drugs diminish psychotic symptomatology and delay relapse not by acting on the causes of mental illness, but simply
by slowing the patient's mental processes. 12 1 Without a convincing theory to
justify drugs' special claims, and with more prosaic explanations of drug "success" available, it would appear that drugs should be deemed, at best, a limited
"antipsychotic" measure.
6. Drug Effects and the New State Psychiatric Regime
Powerful, benevolent, antipsychotic properties cannot be inferred from the
wide use of drugs by state psychiatry. The drugs undeniably have custodyenhancing effects which alone can account for every distinctive feature of the
modem state psychiatric system. Indeed, it would appear that much the same
system would have evolved based on drugging even if the drugs had no claim
at all to antipsychotic effects.
Despite the drugs' warm reception into state psychiatry, it was not assumed
in 1953 that Thorazine and other drugs would have revolutionary consequences for the mental health system. 122 For decades the building blocks of
state mental health policy had remained hospitalization, public custody, and
physical restraint. State psychiatry had accommodated new therapies as they
group of patients improve enough with drugs to function part-time on their own. Nevertheless, all of these patients are still schizophrenic, and there is no evidence that any enduring
and fundamental change has been achieved by medication.
Grinspoon, Ewalt & Shader, Long Term Treatment of ChronicSchizophrenia: A PreliminaryReport, 4
INT'L J. PSYCHIATRY 116, 126-27 (1967). See also Insanity Defense Work Group, American Psychiatric
Association Statement on the Insanity Defense, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 681, 686-87 (1983) (while treatment helpful in reducing overt signs and symptoms of mental illness, cure not necessarily achieved or
nondangerousness assured); Comment, supra note 36, at 562 (psychotropic drugs do not cure schizophrenia but relieve symptoms).
119. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (discussing relapse rates of patients).
120. See supra notes 81 to 84 and accompanying text (discussing effectiveness of drugs).
121. See supranote 118; see also 1955 SyMposiuM, supra note 15, at 73 ("In some, this drug induced
reduction in drive, motility and impulsivity may be so pronounced that it assumes Parkinsonian proportions. Far from constituting complications, however, these actions are held to be closely related to
the drug's psychiatric effectiveness"); Deniker, supranote 118, at 92 (noting that Thorazine characteristically "produces a very unique syndrome of psychomotor indifference").
122. See generally 1955 SyMposiuM, supra note 15. The drugs' potential for changing the nature of
state hospitals-making them calmer, more treatment-oriented places-was the object of much symposium discussion. Id at 83-84. Increased discharge rates were anticipated, but the disappearance of
mental hospitals as such generally was not. Rather, a calmer and reduced patient population was
expected to permit hospitals to be more effective therapeutically. Id at 88-89, 145. A few symposium
participants, however, did see the potential for a dramatic shift to nonhospital care. See, e.g., id at 16667 (drugs would enable most patients to be cared for at home or at "travelling clinics"); see also Swazey,
supra note 10, at 216-19 (noting dramatic shift away from custodial care in "disturbed wards" since
advent of drugs).
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were developed without the system undergoing any fundamental structural
change.
To comprehend why drugs proved to be so different from predecessor therapies (without supposing drugs to be miraculous cures), the reasons behind the
resilience of the old psychiatric regime must be understood. Earlier therapies
were used too rarely to have much impact. For example, only a minority of
patients underwent lobotomy operations. 2 3 In addition, a therapy such as lobotomy could be so debilitating that administering it actually diminished the
patient's chance of hospital discharge. 124 Moreover, even when a therapy,
such as electroshock, enjoyed wide use and was not permanently debilitating,
its effects could be too short-lived or modest and too dependent on a hospital
setting to appreciably reduce the institutional census. Thus, long-term hospitalization remained indispensable; physical restraints continued, and states
kept operating the mental hospitals.
Why Drugs Are Different.
Drugs differ from previous forms of treatment in each of these respects. Drugs subdue psychotic behavior but do not
generally debilitate patients in the process. Moreover, administering the drugs
does not require a medical setting. No machines are involved, no elaborate
medical precautions are necessary, and no specially trained medical staff is
required. Patients must only be persuaded to swallow a pill or to submit to an
injection, both of which can be done anywhere. Thus, drugs promise longlasting effects outside of a hospital setting.
Drugs make custody possible without
Drugs and Deinstitutionalization.
its traditional physical trappings. To house a drugged population, the thick
walls, physical barriers, 125 geographical isolation, and staff supervision of state
mental hospitals are generally unnecessary.
Any custodian, particularly one of the mentally ill, must keep his or her
charges' behavior within limits that the institution can accommodate. He or
she must be able to issue commands with confidence that they will be followed,
or else he or she must be able to subdue the patients by force-a task generally
requiring a large staff, a secure building, and a willingness on the staffs part to
inflict and to endure physical insults. Drugs, however, allow patients to be
confined in marginally staffed, minimally secure, and fragilely constructed
community settings, as opposed to physically secure hospitals.
Drugs are remarkably efDrugs and the Decline of PhysicalRestraint.
fective restraining devices 126 and are easier than physical restraint to adminis123. Sterling estimates that in the 40 years since its invention about 50,000 lobotomies have been
performed. Sterling, supra note 14, at 150.
124. Id at 134-35.
125. One participant at a medico-legal conference observed that: "[T]he Eskimos used specially reinforced igloos for their psychotics, and the Aruba on the equator have specially reinforced palm
houses. Even primitive societies do not try to keep their community psychotics in standard housing."
WYATr v. STICKNEY, RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT 218 (L. Jones & R. Parlour eds. 1981).

126. See Reich & Seigel, supranote 17, at 270 (some drugged patients either remain in bed or wander
around "zombie-like"); Note, A Common Law Remedyfor ForcibleMedication of the Insiitutionalizd

Mentally I/, 82 COLUM. L. RaV. 1720, 1739 (1982) (sufficiently high doses of drugs may immobilize
patients). Prisons and juvenile institutions, as well as mental hospitals, use drugs as restraints. See
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ter and maintain, but restraint is not their most important custody-enhancing
effect. Drugs also possess a remarkable potential for undermining individual
will and self-direction, thereby producing a psychological state of unusual receptiveness to the directions of custodians. When this condition progresses too
far, it is deemed akinesia, but in its milder forms, the phenomenon, which
renders confinees submissive and compliant,127 is almost certainly an intended
result of state drugging.
Drugs also ease the burden of the custodian's remaining tasks, such as keeping his charges nourished and clean. Physical restraints and seclusion made
every requirement of confinee life an onerous staff task. Physically restrained
patients were individually fed by staff, or by mechanical means. Similarly,
staff accompanied every restrained or secluded patient to the bathroom; if patients could not leave their rooms, staff had to clean up after patients who
soiled themselves. Simple tranquilization or chemical sedation involved the
same problems: patients too tranquilized to walk or follow instructions might
just as well be physically restrained, from the staffs point of view. By contrast,
drugged patients are generally ambulatory and, as just noted, unusually sensitive to direction from their custodians. They can walk to the dining area en
masse, feed themselves, return to their28quarters, and relieve themselves. This
condition entails minimal staff effort.'
Drugs andthe Sh/i to PrivateForms of Custody.
Drugs thus supplanted
physical restraint because they are more effective restraints. They reduce the
role of the psychiatric hospital by making a secure form of custody possible
without the hospital's large staff, protective architecture, and geographical isolation. The connection between drugs and state psychiatry's third distinctive
feature-the shift to private custody of the mentally ill-is, however, more
subtle. Drugs, in theory, could coexist with a system of small, publicly operated custodial arrangements, such as a network of state-operated boarding
homes. What, if anything, ties drugs to the system of private custody for the
mentally ill?
Plotkin & Gill, Invisible Manacles: DruggingMentally RetardedPeople, 31 STAN. L. Rev. 637, 639-44

(1979) (drugs given to retarded inmates for tranquilizing effect despite absence of any medical reason
for drugging); see also Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.) (nonphysicians' drugging ofjuveniles in
correctional facility to control excited behavior held unconstitutional), cert. denied,417 U.S. 976 (1974).
127. See Van Putten, May & Wilkins, Importance ofAkinesla: Plasma Chlorpromazineand Prolactin
Levels, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1446, 1446 (1980) (patient exhibiting symptoms of akinesia "seemingly

locked in some peaceful apathetic remoteness").
Two doctors who ingested one of these drugs as an experiment described this effect:
[I]t was marked and very similar in both of us: within ten minutes a marked slowing of
thinking and movement developed, along with profound inner restlessness. Neither subject
could continue work, and each left work for over 36 hours. Each subject complained of a
paralysis of volition, a lack of physical and psychic energy. The subjects felt unable to read,
telephone or perform household tasks of their own will, but could perform these tasks if demanded to do so [sic]. There was no sleepiness or sedation; on the contrary, both subjects
complained of severe anxiety.
Belmaker & Wald, Haloperidolin Normals, 131 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 222 (1977). This psychological
state, induced in confmees, must be every overweening jailer's ideal.
128. It is hardly surprising that a participant at the 1955 Symposium on Thorazine commented that
"[e]very day at least one or two ward people mention how much easier their job is since we started
putting Thorazine to such wide use." 1955 SYMPOsIUM, supra note 15, at 98.
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The connection is built upon a cultural attitude toward drugs and physical
restraint, respectively. Were it not for drugs, physical restraint, confinement,
and crude somatic measures for subduing confinees would have remained the
primary means of dealing with serious mental illness. Private facilities that
routinely bound, shackled, restrained, benumbed, or secluded the mentally ill
would be intolerable today, because the state jealously guards its monopoly on
physical force. 129 Thus, shifting custody from public to private institutions depended on the invention of a treatment form that made private management of
mental illness consistent with evolving general norms about physical force and
restraint. What private custodians cannot be allowed to accomplish with physical restraint, they can do even more efficiently by drugging-without serious
objection from any quarter. It is simply taken for granted that
drugs are a
130
medical measure unconnected to police or custodial purposes.
Thus, every distinctive feature of the new public mental health regime is
paralleled by the chemical properties of the drugs, none of which is curative in
nature or necessarily benevolent in effect. A society motivated by desires to
phase out state hospitals to save money, to transfer the mentally ill into private
custody to free the state from official responsibility, and to employ restraints
more powerful and effective than leather straps or straitjackets, would embrace
drugs even if the mentally ill suffered more as a result. At the very least, one
cannot conclude that state psychiatry's wide adoption of the drugs is evidence
of the chemicals' benevolence or "antipsychotic" mode of action.
B. SELF-CHARACTERIZATION

Given the drugs' double-edged promise as medical and custody-enhancing
measures, and given the plausible picture of state psychiatry using drugs primarily for their custody-enhancing effects, the next factor in state-professional
analysis takes on added weight. By the mistakes it has made and by its response to those mistakes over the past thirty years, state psychiatry may have
marked itself as a professional (or political) undertaking. In other words, state
drugging may have characterized itself.1'1
1. The Psychiatric Response to Tardive Dyskinesia
One drug side effect, tardive dyskinesia, 3 2 is an important test of self-characterization. Because of its irreversible and often grotesque symptoms, tardive
dyskinesia is widely considered to be the most serious potential consequence of
drugging. Did state psychiatry's posture toward tardive dyskinesia bespeak
the high traditions of medical science, with doctors paying it close attention?
Or did state psychiatry approach tardive dyskinesia with the attitude of custodians, determined to protect their most effective means of control at almost any
129. Such arrangements, however, have flourished in other eras. See Dershowitz, The Origins of
Preventive Confinement in Anglo-American Law - PartP. The English Experience,43 U. CIN. L. Rnv. 1,
40-44 (1974) (describing physical abuse in "private madhouses" in 17th- and 18th-century London).
130. See infra note 201 and accompanying text (discussing drugs' cultural status as medical

prerogative).
131. See supratext accompanying note 68.
132. See supranotes 85 to 90 and accompanying text (discussing tardive dyskinesia).
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cost? Precisely because of tardive dyskinesia's seriousness, which would attract public attention, custodians would ignore the disorder.
State psychiatry adopted the second posture. Tardive dyskinesia was slow to
be acknowledged by academic psychiatrists and slower still to enter the calculations of ward physicians, who, throughout the 1970s, virtually ignored it.
Academic Psychiatrists.
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, a few reports,
usually involving individual patients, appeared on tardive dyskinesia.133 The
condition had no agreed-upon name and was thought134to be rare. Indeed, the
evidence of its very existence was not overwhelming.
A breakthrough, and an omen of research psychiatry's attitude, came in
1967. Dr. George Crane, a National Institute of Mental Health researcher,
had examined patients in randomly selected mental hospital wards and reported that nearly thirty percent of them-at the time, an unheard of percentage-manifested tardive dyskinesia's symptoms. 35 Crane's findings,
however, met with disbelief, derision, and admonition not to invent
a side ef36
fect without any "clinical or scientific evidence" to back it up.'
137
Crane's report threatened to change prevailing patterns of drug use.
Tardive dyskinesia recalled the disgraced lobotomy operation whose permanent side effects had proven to be its downfall.' 38 The vehement adverse reac133. Crane, Tardive Dyskinesia in Patients Treated with Major Neuroleptics: A Review fthe Literature, 124 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 40 (Supp. 1968) [hereinafter cited as Crane,A Review ofthe Literature];see
also Crane, Tardive Dyskinesia in Schizophrenic Patients Treated with Psychotropic Drugs, in SECOND
INT'L SYMP. ON ACTION MECHANISM AND METABOLISM OF PSYCHOACTIVE DRUGS DERIVED FROM

PHENOTHIAZINE AND STRUCTURALLY RELATED COMPOUNDS 209, 217 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
Crane, Tardive Dyskinesia Report].
134. Crane, 4 Review ofthe Literature,supranote 133, at 45.
135. Crane, Tardive Dyskinesia Report, supranote 133, at 216.
136. Id at 218 (discussion remarks of Dr. Kline).

Dr. Crane's paper and the response to it constitute, I believe, two pivotal events in 20th century
psychiatry. Crane's findings challenged the prevailing view that drugs, unlike lobotomies, had no widespread, permanent side effects. Moreover, Crane depicted tardive dyskinesia as a potentially disfiguring rather than trivial condition.
Crane delivered his report orally before an audience that included two pre-eminent psychiatrists: the
American, Dr. Nathan Kline, and the Frenchman, Dr. Pierre Denber. An "emergency discussion"
ensued. Dr. Kline disagreed with Crane completely. Since the introduction of neuroleptics, he said,
there bad been "no great change in the appearance of the patients" in mental hospitals. Id at 218.
"Let us not produce an epidemic of side-effects and papers," Kline admonished Crane, "unless there is
real evidence of it, either clinically or scientifically." Id Furthermore, Kline noted that only 83 cases of
tardive dyskinesia had been reported, including 50 patients who were brain-damaged. Id In his view,
"[s]chizophrenics are notorious lovers of stereotypic movements so that the condition tends to perpetuate itself. In a sense it is a kind of conditioning." Id at 217. Moreover, he claimed success in "deconditioning" one patient with tardive dyskinesia. Id at 218.
Dr. Crane replied:
Dr. Kline quoted figures as to the rarity of the disease. The disease is rare because it is not
reported. For instance, no patient included in my presentation was reported in the literature.
The difference between schizophrenic stereotypics and this neurological syndrome is very
marked; as one becomes familiar with the syndrome there is no difficulty in distinguishing the
two types of clinical manifestations.
Id
137. See id at 216 (questioning whether increase in tardive dyskinesia would affect future use of
neuroleptic drugs).
138. For further discussion of the parallels between drugs and lobotomy, see infra text accompanying
notes 189 to 191, 194.
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tion to Crane's works bespoke an awareness of the high stakes involved. 139
According to Crane, who continued to publish papers and who pressed his
views at the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), there was "strong opposition on the part of the medical profession, industry and also government agencies [to] . . .accept[ing]" tardive dyskinesia as a serious medical problem.140

Until 1972, Crane "had many discussions with prominent clin[i]cians in academic circles. . . [but] for the first few years, [and] until 1971, '72, they denied the existence [of tardive dyskinesia] as a disorder or felt the disorder was
unimportant." 141
In 1972 the barriers fell. The package inserts accompanying the drugs were
amended to include tardive dyskinesia as a possible side effect,' 42 and academic psychiatry finally acknowledged the condition. 14 3 The Archives of
General Psychiatry published a "special report" about tardive dyskinesia, announcing that "patients [who clearly show this syndrome] are not uncommon." 44 An accompanying essay hailed this report as proof "that there
indeed are resources in American psychiatry exercising medical accountability
and equipped to exert scientific scrutiny over issues which affect the welfare of
the mentally ill"' 4 5-reflecting psychiatry's awareness that tardive dyskinesia
tested its professional and moral credibility. Whether the test was passed,
however, entirely is another matter.
The enormity of psychiatry's default in the late 1960s and early 1970s should
not be underestimated. Patients must have suffered tardive dyskinesia at
roughly the same rate as they do now, 14 6 yet in psychiatric circles, this grotesque disease was widely said not to exist at all. Almost no one noticed the
obvious symptoms that were everywhere in mental hospitals-a development
all the more striking due to the obviousness of the symptoms and
the ease with
47
which confined mental patients can be studied and observed.
139. Dr. Denber stated that "sweeping conclusions" like Crane's threatened to "undo the past 15years of work," id at 218, apparently referring to Thorazine's 15-year tenure in psychiatry.
140. Joint Appendix, supra note 94, at 1087a-88a (testimony of Dr. George Crane); see also Crane,
supra note 20, at 127-28 (government and drug companies failed to show serious interest in tardive
dyskinesia despite considerable evidence about problem).
141. Joint Appendix, supra note 94, at 1088a.
142. Id
143. See id; see also American College of Neuropsychopharmacology-Food and Drug Administration Task Force, supranote 101, at 463 (American College of Neuropsychopharmacology and FDA
"have recognized the seriousness of these complications and established a task force").
144. American College of Neuropsychopharmacology-Food and Drug Administration Task Force,
supranote 101, at 463.
145. Id at 467.
146. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
147. In the latter part of the 1970s, psychiatric journals overflowed with studies of tardive dyskinesia.
SeeJeste & Wyatt, ChangingEpidemiologyof Tardive .Dyskinesia:An Overview, 138 AM.J.PSYCHIATRY
297, 300-01, 307-09 (1981) (citing published studies). No attention, however, is paid to why psychiatrists had ignored the disorder before. Indeed, Jeste and Wyatt reason that the increasing reports of the

disease in medical journals mean that its incidence is on the rise. Id at 300-01. Even legal commentators take this approach. See, e.g., Plotkin, supranote 30, at 476 (tardive dyskinesia "went unrecognized

for years because its symptoms are often not manifested until late in the course of treatment"). Of
course, this approach fails to explain why Dr. Crane found high incidences of tardive dyskinesia in the
late 1960s.
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Although academic psychiatry's disregard
State Psychiatry'sResponse.
for tardive dyskinesia ended in the early 1970s, 148 clinical state psychiatry's
calculated ignorance of it had just begun. Despite the condition's notoriety,
state doctors almost never diagnosed it and never took serious steps to minimize, manage, or prevent the condition during the next decade. State mental
hospitals simply ignored tardive dyskinesia, as academic psychiatrists had the
decade before.
Though no systematic study of state psychiatry's practice toward tardive
dyskinesia exists,' 49 a clear picture emerges from the available information.
The published psychiatric literature of the early 1980s makes it clear that, until
that time, tardive dyskinesia had received little clinical attention.' 5 0 Moreover, when Dr. Crane surveyed state mental hospital systems in the 1970s, he
consistently found that physicians neither diagnosed tardive dyskinesia nor
even acknowledged the existence of its symptoms.' 5 '
Clinical disregard of the condition was profound enough to leave other
traces in the historical record. A mid-1970s General Accounting Office survey
of Veterans' Administration hospital drugging concerned itself with side effects, but the study did not even mention tardive dyskinesia.152 A more recent
similar study of New York mental hospitals, one of the largest state mental
health systems, likewise ignored the disorder.1t 3 Public hospitals did not rec148. Dr. Crane testified in Rennie that there was "no precedent" in modem medicine for doctors
ignoring a psychiatric problem as serious as tardive dyskinesia for such long period of time. Joint
Appendix, supra note 94, at 1093a.
I believe that Dr. Crane's moral genius and devotion to the truth were largely responsible for tardive
dyskinesia's recognition in 1972. But for Crane, organized psychiatry would have continued to ignore
the disease for several more years. Nevertheless, organized psychiatry did confront tardive dyskinesia;
thus one can argue that research psychiatry has behaved professionally-rather than politically--toward this condition since 1972.
I will not pursue this question any further, since it is state, and not academic, psychiatry that is being
characterized. For my purposes, it is enough to say that a strong disinclination to acknowledge that
tardive dyskinesia was already apparent before the arguably overworked and undertrained state hospital staffs confronted the issue. Moreover, since the themes and rationalizations of the academic debate
reappear unchanged in the clinical setting, see infra notes 149 to 161 and accompanying text, it is
instructive to confront them for the first time in another context.
149. Of course, research in academic psychiatry focuses on the disorder and its incidence-not on
whether state doctors actually ignored it. As several researchers have noted, "Despite the voluminous
literature on psychotropic drugs, very little information is available on the actual prescription practices
in mental hospitals." Mason, Nerviano, & DeBurger, PatternsofAntipsychotic Drug Use in FourSoutheastern State Hospitals,38 DISEASES OF THE NERVOUS SYSTEM 541, 541 (1977).
150. See, e.g., Gardos & Cole, supranote 86, at 776 ("A quarter of a century into the neuroleptic era,
drug-induced tardive dyskinesia has emerged as a significant public health problem"); Opler, Katz,
Kobayashi & Ruiz, Tardive Dyskinesia and InstitutionalPractice: Current Issues and Guidelines, 31
HosP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 239, 239 (1980) ("Many recent reviews document that [sic] tardive

dyskinesia is a very real, most often late complication of long-term neuroleptic treatment, and they end
by cautioning the clinician to take this factor into account as one more consideration in the treatment of
chronic psychosis. Unfortunately these cautions have had little impact on individual and institutional
practice"); Task Force on Late Neurological Effects of Antipsychotic Drugs, Tardive Dyskinesia: Summary of a Task ForceReport oftheAmerican PsychiatricAssociation,137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1163, 1163

(1980) (generally regarding problem as recently discovered and of increasing concern).
151. Joint Appendix, supra note 94, at 1087a (Testimony of Dr. Crane).
152. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS:

CONTROLS ON
THE USE OF PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC DRUGS AND IMPROVED STAFFING ARE NEEDED IN VETERANS ADMINISTRATION HOSPITALS (1975).
153. OFFICE OF THE STATE COMPTROLLER, DIVISION OF AUDITS AND ACCOUNTS, STATE OF NEW
YORK, ADMINISTRATION OF PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC DRUGS AT CREEDMOOR, ROCKLAND AND UTICAMARCY PSYCHIATRIC CENTERS, AND LETCHWORTH VILLAGE DEVELOPMENT CENTER (1978).
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ognize tardive dyskinesia as a clinical entity worth any attention.
The most complete picture of a state mental hospital system's attitude toward tardive dyskinesia in the late 1970s appears in the Rennie v. Klein trial
record. According to the hospital medical directors, the four New Jersey hos154
pitals involved in the case had never, as of 1978, diagnosed the syndrome.
When Dr. Crane, as the Rennie plaintiffs' expert witness, surveyed selected
New Jersey mental hospital wards, however, he found that approximately
twenty percent of the patients had tardive dyskinesia. t 55 Not a single patient
chart contained the diagnosis, however, and the charts almost never noted
tardive dyskinesia's obvious symptoms: twitches, movements, and grotesque
postures.1 56 No datum or observation that suggested tardive dyskinesia's existence received official recognition from the hospitals.
The hospitals could control the contents of their patient records, but how did
they explain tardive dyskinesia's grotesque movements to those afflicted, their
families, and interested outsiders? Since severely regressed patients do not ask
questions or demand explanations, in many cases the hospital need say nothing. When pressed, however, the hospitals in New Jersey adopted one or more
of three different expedients. Staff branded symptoms as faking. 15 7 They attributed grotesque movements to mental illness or "nerves,"'' 5 8 just as prominent researchers in 1967 had dismissed reports of widespread dyskinetic
movements.1 59 In addition, as Dr. Crane's survey in Rennie found, hospital
staffs denied that obvious grotesque movements existed at all,' 60 just as academic psychiatrists earlier had failed to notice symptoms.16 t Other state hospitals must have resorted to similar expedients to explain away tardive
dyskinesia's grotesque manifestations.
State psychiatry's approach to tardive dyskinesia bears the earmarks of state
overreaching, not medical error. Its missteps defy explanation in terms of professional carelessness, lack of medical knowledge (indeed, physicians had to
know which grotesque movements to ignore), or shortages of medical staff.
Hospitals developed an official-and inherently incredible-version of the
truth to serve their narrow custodial interests. There was widespread lying to
patients about the grotesque, drug-caused movements that led the victims to
blame themselves for their deformity. Physical distress was visited on patients,
with a nonchalance suggesting that the harms-and the patients-counted for
nothing at all. Patients were treated as fungible objects, with no regard paid to
their individual response to drugs. More remarkably, this approach produced
virtually no dissent in state psychiatric circles. Indeed, the only vocal dissenter
154. Rennie, 476 F. Supp. at 1300 (citing to trial record).
155. Joint Appendix, supranote 94, at 1065a-69a, 108 1a-83a.
156. Rennie, 476 F. Supp. at 1300-03 (obvious symptoms not included in patients' charts).
157. IM at 1301.
158. Joint Appendix, supra note 94, at 1343a, 2307a (hospital staff attributed John Rennie's tardive

dyskinesia to "psychological difficulties").
159. See supra note 136 (describing discussion between Dr. Crane and Dr. Kline).
160. See supranote 155; see also Shavill, supra note 30, at 595 n.279 (in connection with court hear-

ing on hospital's petition to forcibly medicate patient, attorney noticed lip and tongue movements
symptomatic of tardive dyskinesia, which hospital doctors had not mentioned in court report).
161. See Crane, Tardive Dyskinesia Report, supra note 133.
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in the 1970s among academicians, researchers, and National Institute of
Health officials was Dr. Crane.
2. Self-Characterization and Other Drug Side Effects
The track record on tardive dyskinesia is not the sole reason for warranting
a political characterization of state drugging. State psychiatry's decision to
drug nearly every patient and to downplay other adverse, reversible drug reactions also is relevant.
There is a palpable feeling in state hospitals that drug-taking is the duty of
everyone subject to the institution's power. 162 This appears, on its face, more a
political than a medical obligation of patients. 63 Other side effects and drug
consequences that might interfere with this duty are ignored, as was (and still
is) tardive dyskinesia. Thus, although state psychiatry's goal is to alleviate
mental suffering, it has been observed that physicians almost never ask patients how drugs make them feel. l 6 If the doctors did ask, it appears they
would not like the answers-up to forty percent of patients react to drugs with
discomfort or depression that generally is overlooked. 65 Similarly, state physicians usually interpret drug withdrawal symptoms-which have no connection
to naturally occurring disease-as signs of resurgent psychosis, and their
rem66
edy for this kind of drug-caused distress is to prescribe more drugs.'
Moreover, state psychiatry's general view toward reversible side effects has
resembled its stand toward tardive dyskinesia, albeit without the stark pattern
of nonacknowledgement.' 67 Researchers were quick to note reversible side effects in the 1950s,168 and state hospitals did not hesitate to acknowledge their
existence in principle. Indeed, during the 1950s and 1960s, many psychiatrists,
making a virtue out of the inevitable, viewed side effects as signs of drug effec162. For discussion of the near-universal use of drugs in state hospitals, see supra note 20. Numerous academic psychiatrists point out that a minority of patients-perhaps a substantial minoritywould do better, or at least no worse, when drug-free, and therefore conclude that the current practice
of drugging almost every patient is a mistake. See, e.g., Davis, Recent Developments in Drug Treatment
of Schizophrenia,133 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 208, 210 (1976) (although "a substantial number of patients
improve considerably on placebo. . . most schizophrenic patients do receive neuroleptics, so the implicit assumption of many psychiatrists may be that neuroleptics are indicated for all cases of schizophrenia, a somewhat undifferentiated treatment strategy"); Gardos'& Cole, supra note 84, at 36
(perhaps 50% of stabilized schizophrenics would do just as well drug-free); see also Rennie, 476 F. Supp.
at 1298 (trial record reflected that many patients treated with psychotropics could improve with smaller
doses, or no drugs at all). See generally Carpenter, McGlashan & Strauss, supra note 82; May, Van
Putten & Yale, supra note 84.
163. See, e.g., Shavill, supra note 30, at 591 (drug refusal per se disrupts "therapeutic milieu" because
it "undermines the good will of other patients on the ward"; moreover, structure of therapeutic milieu is
derived from authority of therapist and drug refusal "undermine[s]" that structure, thereby "contributing to anxiety on the part of other patients"). Based on this view, one's duties to the ward itself and to
fellow patients require acquiesence in drugging, no matter what the consequences to the individual.
Compare Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1926). Such views, I believe, are common in state psychiatry.
164. Van Putten & May, supra note 98, at 480.
165. Id at 478,
166. See generally Gardos, Cole & Tarsy, Withdrawal Syndromes Associated with Antipsychotic
Drugs, 135 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1321 (1978).
167. Since reversible side effects received some acknowledgement, generalizations about how state
hospitals handled them cannot be made with the same confidence as generalizations about tardive
dyskinesia, which was completely ignored in word and deed.
168. See, e.g., 1955 SYMPOSiUM, supranote 15, at 37, 58-61 (discussion by symposium participants on
drugs' effects). See generally Ayd, .4 Survey of DrugInduced ExtrapyramidalReactions, 175 J. A.M.A.
1054 (1961); Hall, Jackson & Swain, supra note 91.
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tiveness. 169 Although that idea is now totally discredited,17 0 there remains a
reluctance in clinical state psychiatry to actually diagnose these side effects-a
reluctance that seems to increase in proportion to the side effect's negative implications for future drug use.
Dr. Crane, perhaps the only research psychiatrist of his generation to seriously study state psychiatry's diagnostic attitudes toward side effects, once
again is an important source. Crane's New Jersey study17 1 included drug-induced, Parkinson-like tremors, generally thought to be reversible and quite
common, as well as tardive dyskinesia. He found that the state physicians
often ignored obvious drug-caused tremors, neither charting their existence
nor diagnosing them as symptoms of drug-induced Parkinsonism.1 72 Unlike
tardive dyskinesia, however, this Parkinsonism received occasional attention 1in
73
patient charts, and doctors did not claim this problem to be nonexistent.
The Rennie record also depicted several cases in which staff ignored obvious
reversible side effects and, when pressed, either branded the patients as "fakers" or invoked one of the other rationalizations that were used in cases of
abound of state psychiatrists elsewhere simitardive dyskinesia. 174 Accounts 75
larly ignoring these side effects.'
Some drug research literature also suggests the extent to which reversible
side effects have been ignored. For example, one study of Prolixin reported
that thirty-five percent of the experimental subjects developed serious akinesia
and as a result had to be dropped from the study. 176 The high incidence of
169. See, e.g., 1955 SYMPosiUM, supranote 15, at 51, 55-57, 67 & 73; Deniker, supra note 118, at 92
(side effects may be necessary to cure disease). In his well-informed 1976 study of drug issues, DuBose
remarked on the "intuitive notion shared by many psychiatrists that the effective dosage level of a drug
is reached only when side effects appear." DuBose, supra note 36, at 1176 n.70.
170. See, e.g., Kane & Smith, Tardive Dyskinesia: Prevalence and Risk Factors, 1959 to 1979, 39
ARcHivEs GEN. PSYCHIATRY 473, 479-80 (1982) (urging efforts to seek lowest effective dose of
neuroleptics to minimize occurrence of tardive dyskinesia).
171. See supra note 155.
172. Joint Appendix, supra note 94, at 1069a-83a.
173. Id at 1076a-77a.
174. 476 F.2d at 1300-03.
175. See, e.g., Wexler & Scoville, The Administration ofPsychiatricJustice: Theory and Practicein
Arizona, 13 ARIZ. L. Rav. 1, 68, 203 n.10 (1971) ("hospital feels that many of the patients who appear to
be heavily sedated are simply very regressed psychologically"); Ferleger, Loosing the Chains: ln.l-osl.
tal Civil Liberties ofMental Patients, 13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 447, 448-49 (1973) (nurse refused to respond to patient's complaints that medication produced adverse side effects); see also Naughton v.
605 F.2d 586 (1st Cir. 1979) (staff allegedly ignored
Bevilacqua, 458 F. Supp. 610 (D.R.I. 1978), afd't'
patient's extreme reactions to Prolixin).
My own experience representing patients in New Jersey mental hospitals comports with this picture.
I never knew a psychiatrist who discontinued drugs because of side effects. Often doctors ignored drug
distress that-it seemed to me-easily could have been alleviated. This harsh practice was the rule
rather than the exception. On occasion, the doctors did shift to a different member of the same family
of drugs in hopes of avoiding drug-caused harms, and doctors routinely prescribed anti-side effect
drugs. Patients whose side effects did not abate with these measures-and there were many-simply
continued to suffer. No fact that suggested drug discontinuation might be in order was ever acknowledged in patient charts.
Some patients fared even worse. Those who complained, who antagonized staff, or who sought my
help in connection with drugs usually received Prolixin, a drug notorious among patients and staff for
producing the most severe side effects. In John Rennie's own case, for example, Prolixin had always
caused him great suffering and-in his view and in my view--often had driven him to suicide attempts,
Yet Prolixin was the one drug staff insisted on giving him when he enlisted my help. See supra note 97
(describing patients' reaction to drugs); Rennie, 462 F. Supp. at 1138, 1140, 1143 (court faulted hospital
staff for ignoring Rennie's reports of suffering from akinesia while on Prolixin).
176. Rifkin, Quitkin, Rabiner & Klein, supra note 82, at 45.
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akinesia surprised the authors, 177 but every one of the research subjects had
been treated with Prolixin during the preceding year at a clinic,' 7 8 where physicians apparently had failed to notice akinesia.
In general, the patterns of thought and practice evident in state psychiatry's
posture toward tardive dyskinesia are recurring. First, nonbeneficial, reversible drug side effects fail to register with state psychiatrists. A manifest disinclination to look for these drug harms pervades day-to-day practice. As
already noted, for example, state psychiatrists generally do not even ask patients how drugs make them feel. 179 At the same time, symptoms of mental
illness, like social deterioration, which are unresponsive to drugs, do not appear in calculations of therapeutic success and failure, which are measured,
ironically, in terms of the number of days that one is free of inpatient psychiatric hospital treatment.'8 0 Furthermore, an overwhelming presumption in state
psychiatry that all harms are caused by the absence of drugs in the bloodstream mistakenly attributes relapses' 8 ' and the distress that results from drug
withdrawal' 8 2 to a lack of drugging, just as drug-caused harms are generally
attributed to naturally-occurring disease. 8 3 Thus, it is not surprising that
drug-caused harms, after being well established in the literature, are quickly
forgotten in clinical practice. For instance, fifteen years after Thorazine's codiscoverer proclaimed akinesia to be almost a signature of Thorazine's presence in the body, 184 it was described as a "poorly recognized drug-induced
.. . behavioral disorder."185 What psychiatrists refuse to see in their patients
directly, they also refuse to learn about from books.' 86 The result, in the eyes
of many state psychiatrists, is that drugs can do no wrong to any patient at any
time. All distinctions among patients collapse into their common responsibility to submit to drug actions.
Of course, intellectual biases prevail in every scientific I8 7 and professional
endeavor. The existence of conceptual presumptions and paradigms, without
more, hardly marks an endeavor as unscientific, unprofessional, or political.
Clinical state psychiatry's "paradigm"--if that is the appropriate term-is
"political," however, in a number of respects. Its disregard of apparent facts
and its simple-minded view of drug response are difficult to reconcile with any
177. Id at 44.
178. Id at 43-44.
179. See supra note 164.
180. See Carpenter, Heinrichs & Hanlon, supra note 81.
181. See Hogarty, Schooler, Ulrich, Mussare, Ferro & Herron, Fuphenazineand Social Therapy in
the Aftercare of Schizophrenic Patients: Relapse Analses of a Two-Year Controlled Study of
Fluphenazine Decanoate and FluphenazineHydrochloride,36 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1283, 1288
(1979) (patients whose drug intake was assured relapsed at same rate as patients free to discontinue
drugs); see supra note 162.
182. See supranote 162 (discussing conclusions of some psychiatrists that patients would fare better

if drug-free).
183. See generally Rifkin, Quitkin & Klein, supranote 95 (authors show how drug-induced akinesia
often confused with depression and residual schizophrenia).
184. Deniker, supra note 118, at 92.
185. Rifkin, Quitkin & Klein, supra note 95, at 672.
186. See Crane, The Prevention ofTardiveDyskinesia, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 756, 757-58 (1977) ("It
is quite obvious that the publication of articles on tardive dyskinesia and the pleas of a few investigators

to use neuroleptic drugs with greater discretion have had little impact on the prescribing practices of
physicians.")
187. See generally T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970).
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bona fide scientific or professional view. The apparent motivation is to maximize drugging because of the drugs' custody-enhancing effects-a political
rather than a scientific objective. Its reduction of individuals to fungible entities without distinguishing characteristics, its tolerance for state-induced distress, and its apparent willingness to conceal the truth bespeaks political
overreaching more than scientific or professional error. Because of these considerations and because every inference in favor of continued drugging seems
to be indulged in the face of "reversible" and "irreversible" side effects alike,
state drugging has characterized itself as political in nature.
C. THE PSYCHIATRIC PROFESSION

When Dr. George Crane delivered his 1967 report 8 8 about the high incidence of tardive dyskinesia, his audience probably thought of lobotomy. Lobotomy's inventor had received a Nobel Prize in 1949,189 yet, within a few
years, the public and part of the psychiatric community came to regard the
surgery as excessive, ill-conceived, and ill-motivated. 190 This harsh judgment
was influenced by the severity of the operation's side effects, its permanence,
and the fact that psychiatry-to a remarkable extent-had not noticed or acknowledged the problem.' 9 ' Dr. Crane had now found serious permanent
drug side effects, but state psychiatrists would not notice or acknowledge these
either, at least for the next decade. These repeated failures raise a question as
to the bona fide nature of the state psychiatric profession itself.
Any state-professional controversy requires analysis of the profession in
question-its social status, its motivating forces, and its history. The goal of
such analysis is not to punish professionals or to make them relinquish professional prerogatives because of past mistakes. Rather, the profession's credibility and past performance are relevant to the overall question of
characterization. Indeed, the arguments in favor of a professional characterization are ultimately premised on the profession's standing as such. Society
defers to professional judgment because of its source, and if the source has not
lived up to expectations, society, including the courts, should adjust its judgments accordingly.
Psychiatry's self-proclaimed missteps are particularly telling when viewed
from this perspective. The succession of organic therapies in psychiatry over
the past hundred years-bleeding, skull scraping, purging, restraining gadgets,
insulin shock, and lobotomy-do not inspire confidence. The fact that therapies succeed one another is hardly worrisome in itself; it could reflect true scientific progress, as well as changing cultural fashions or the simple juggling of
custodial measures over time. The manner in which therapies rise and fall in
psychiatry, however, is remarkable. With each new therapy's emergence, the
188. Crane, Tardive D1yskinesia Report, supra note 133.
189. Egas Moniz first reported the results of lobotomy in 1939 and was awarded the Nobel Prize in
Medicine 10 years later. 9 INT'L. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOLOGY, PSYCHOANALYSIS
AND NEUROLOGY 306 (B. Wolman ed. 1977).
190. Sterling, supranote 14; Kaimowitz v. Michigan Dept. of Mental Health, No. 73-79434-AV (Cir.
Ct., Wayne County Mich. July 10, 1973), in A. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAL HEALTH
SYSTEM 902, 908-09 (1974); see generally K. KEsEY, ONE FLEW OVER THE CUCKOO'S NEST (1959).
191. Sterling, supra note 14, at 132-35.
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old form of intervention is not respectfully retired but is repudiated and regarded as excessive or perhaps ill-motivated from the start. Meanwhile, the
new therapy is received uncritically and, even after years of use, the harms it
causes remain little noticed.19 2 The entire cycle then repeats itself. Indeed, the
old therapies' repudiation makes the new therapies appear that much better in
contrast.' 93 In this sense, psychiatry's history is an endless succession of
bright, new therapeutic eras, each deemed to be far better than its predecessor,
and all destined to be regarded as deplorable.
In any case, there are strong similarities between psychiatry's receptiveness
to lobotomy and to drugs. Both were regarded as dramatic advances, both
apparently worked via sophisticated biological mechanisms, and in both cases,
serious and obvious side effects went unnoticed. 194 Additionally, there is no
reason to think that psychiatry's internal processes-its capacity to detect the
harms it inflicts and its willingness to deal with those harms meaningfullyhave changed in any fundamental way since lobotomy's heyday.
History has demonstrated psychiatry's lack of maturity as a science-a fact
upon which courts have repeatedly commented.' 95 Accordingly, psychiatry's
judgments should carry less weight than the judgments, for example, of other
medical professions.' 9 6 It is almost unthinkable that a court would question a
192. See id
193. See, e.g., Carpenter, McGlashan & Strauss, supra note 82, at 15 ("[Psychiatry's ignoring of
drugs' noxious effects on behavior, adjustment, and mood] . . . results in a situation not entirely dissimiliar to past enthusiasm for lobotomies, wheit attention focused on the positive attributes of the
procedure to such a degree that the short-term and long-term hazards were overlooked"); Carpenter,

Heinrichs & Hanlon, supra note 81, at 470 ("[research psychiatrists' failure to pay attention to deleterious therapeutic effects] can have serious repercussions as we accept, overgeneralize, and then retreat
from therapeutic innovations").
194. See supranotes 149 to 161 and 190 to 191 and accompanying text (discussing state psychiatry's
disregard of tardive dyskinesia and lobotomy).
195. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 103 S.Ct. 3043, 3049 n.13 (1983) ("[w]e have recognized reEeatedly the uncertainty of diagnosis in this field and the tentativeness of professional judgment");
arham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (acknowledging fallibility of medical and psychiatric diagnoses);
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 579, 584 (1975) (court appropriately took notice of uncertainties
of psychiatric diagnosis and therapy; past cases reflect divergent opinions held within discipline);
Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366, 375 (1956) (testimony of court-appointed psychiatrists illustrated uncertainty of diagnosis and tentativeness of professional judgment).
196. Some judges appear to draw the opposite conclusion-pointing out the tentativeness of psychiatric diagnoses and then deciding, partly on that account, to defer to psychiatric judgment. The foremost example is Chief Justice Burger, whose opinions generally note psychiatry's shortcomings and
then oppose judicial intrusions into psychiatrists' treatment decisions. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. at
608-09; O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. at 579, 584 (Burger, C.J., concurring). The Chief Justice has
reasoned that psychiatry's conclusions are tentative because the underlying problems verge on being
intractable, and no nonpsychiatric agency could improve on the profession's performance.
These analyses, however, came in contexts quite different from the forced drug cases. In O'Connor v.
Donaldson, Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion attacked the claim that involuntarily confined

mental patients enjoyed a right to treatment. "Given the present state of medical knowledge regarding
abnormal human behavior and its treatment," he wrote, "few things would be more fraught with peril
than to irrevocably condition a State's power to protect the mentally ill upon the providing of such
treatment as will give [them] a realistic opportunity to be cured." 422 U.S at 588-89. Nonetheless one
could not argue that the gaps in our knowledge of "abnormal human behavior and its treatment"
justify denying patients the right to refuse those treatments. As the Chief Justice noted, "[O]ne of the
few areas of agreement among behaviorial specialists is that an uncooperative patient cannot benefit
from therapy ...." Id at 579. Similarly, in Parham v. .A., a fourteenth amendment challenge to
admitting children to state mental hospitals on the signature of a parent or guardian, Chief Justice
Burger stated, "[Wle acknowledge the fallibility of medical and psychiatric diagnosis. . .[but] we do
not accept the notion that the shortcomings of specialists can always be avoided by shifting the decision
from a trained specialist using the traditional tools of medical science . . . to an untrained judge or
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competent internist's recommendation that someone's gall bladder be removed, but a psychiatrist's Prolixin prescription is an entirely different matter.
would be foolish to accord equal weight to
Individuals and society at large
97
these two medical judgments.1
Psychiatry is handicapped by its subject matter. Not only has human behavior thus far resisted scientific understanding, but its study is notoriously subject
to passing political tides and cultural fashions. 198 Moreover, state psychiatry-so directly involved in policing behavior-is apt to abuse that very power,
in which case a professional characterization is misplaced and a political one is
required to afford protection from such abuse. 199
In short, the courts should pause long before according weight to psychiatric
consensus opinion. Contrary to the implicit arguments of psychiatrists, their
professional endorsement does not guarantee the drugs' benevolence or moot
the history of the drugs' actual use.
D. THE TRADITIONAL ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY

Up to this point, every consideration has favored a political characterization
of state drugging. However, three factors remain to be considered, 20 0 and each
points the opposite way, toward a professional characterization. The first deals
with the traditional allocation of authority in drugging matters between politics and professionalism.
When something "belongs" in the medical realm, we are inclined to accept
medical decisions about benefit and detriment even if the detriments are great.
By the same token, we are disinclined to tolerate any harm at all if it results
from outside interference-by a judge, for example-with medical judgment.
Who causes the harm is no less relevant than how much harm has been
caused; in this sense, the relevant analysis is role oriented as much as it is
utilitarian in nature.
Political characterizations of state drugging clash with these cultural conventions regarding the realms of medicine, politics, and law. We allocate insanity
administrative hearing officer after a judicial-type hearing." 442 U.S. at 609. Here, however, the Court
already had characterized the parent's decision to hospitalize his or her child as a medical decision, id.,

such as the decision to have a tonsillectomy performed, and it followed that the reasonableness of the
decision would be tested by medical (psychiatric) standards as well. In this context, the argument for
medical as opposed to trial-type procedures is overwhelming. Nonetheless, it surely does not follow that
the "shortcomings" of psychiatric treatment constitute reasons for the courts to defer to psychiatric
judgment.
197. Cf.Aden v. Younger, 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 684, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535, 549 (1976), which either
overlooked or declined to make the distinction suggested in the text, and went on to hold that the
California legislature was bound to treat electroconvulsive therapy as a nonexperimental medical procedure, which an informed, competent patient could elect to undergo without prior medical board
review of the treating physician's recommendation.
198. See, e.g., ROTHMAN, supranote 2; Blackwell, supra note 7, at 3 ("[the state of psychiatric therapy] has often been more reflective of the social, political and legislative climate than of the state of
medical knowledge").
199. The connection between psychiatry and state activity has another dimension. For many years,
state hospitals were preeminent in the care of the seriously mentally ill. Thus, states were important
components in the psychiatric enterprise and--to an extent difficult to determine-may have shaped
that enterprise along political lines.
200. The three factors are traditional allocations of authority between the political and psychiatric
realms, the nature of the problem drugs respond to; and practical constraints on judicial activismactivism being the inevitable result of a political characterization in this field.

19841

MENTAL ILLNESS AND DRUGS

1763

to the medical realm and regard the drugs as preeminently medical measures.
they open themselves to
When courts decide otherwise, even with good 20reason,
1
the charge of usurping a medical prerogative.
The Rogers v. 0k&20 2 record is illustrative. The district court had enjoined
all forcible drugging in nonemergency situations in two Boston State Hospital
wards. After the order had been in force for five years, the case reached the
court of appeals.20 3 There, much was made of a single, drug-refusing patient.
Doctors had detected this man's violent tendencies. As they had understood
the injunction, the danger this patient presented was not imminent enough to
warrant emergency drugging. 20 4 Undrugged, the patient had erupted and
harmed others. When this came to the district court judge's attention, he
faulted the doctors for not declaring an emergency and for not drugging the
patient.20 5 However, the court of appeals took a different view, regarding the
arise from applying
episode as an illustration of the inevitable problems20 that
6
legal tests and standards to state hospital drugging.
It is remarkable that no one regarded this one violent episode as a predictable, unavoidable, and perhaps acceptable cost of the five-year court injunction-a cost more than justified if the injunction prevented a commensurate
amount of drug-caused harm. Since drugs had been implicitly allocated to the
medical realm, however, harm from nonmedical interventions was deemed intolerable. No amount of accompanying benefit could redeem the damage nonphysicians caused. In short, doctors' drugging decisions are justifiable on the
ground that they produce, overall, more good than harm, but nonphysicians'
actions are denied the same utilitarian justification. This is what allocating
drugging to the realm of medicine means, and this is the convention courts
adopting a political characterization must-defy.
E. THE INTRACTABILITY OF THE PROBLEM

Were interlopers in the psychiatric realm allowed utilitarian justifications,
and they are not, it might not make any difference. The underlying problem20 7
to manage the insane humanely-may resist feasible, rational solution.
201. Indeed, the critic may well be another judge. In Jlennie v. Klein, for example, the court of
appeals decried judges "who have doffed their black robes and donned white coats." 653 F.2d at 85 1;
seealso id at 359 (Garth, J., concurring) (district court's standard would require judge "to exchange his
robe for a medical gown"). Thus, by cultural convention, some decisions, including the decision to
drug mental patients, are self-evidently medical.
202. 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), afd in part, rev'd in part, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980),
vacated and remandedsub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982), laterproceeding,Rogers v. Commissioner Dept. of Mental Health, 390 Mass. 489, 458 N.E.2d 308 (1983).
203. The district court issued a temporary restraining order on April 30, 1975, prohibiting forced
nonemergency drugging. The TRO/preliminary injunction remained in effect until October, 1979,
when the court issued a permanent injunction. 478 F. Supp. at 1353. One year later, the circuit court
modified the lower court order. 634 F.2d 650, 653 (1st Cir. 1980).
204. The TRO/preliminary injunction predicated nonemergency forced drugging on an adjudication
of incompetence and the consent of the guardian. 478 F. Supp. at 1353.

205. 478 F. Supp. at 1369 n.36.
206. 634 F.2d at 655-56; see also Schultz, The Boston State HospitalCase: A Conflict of CivilLiberties
and True Liberalism, 139 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 183, 186-87 (1982) (discussing district court order and its

effect on doctors' decisions not to medicate).
207. See supranotes 195 and 196; cf.Chambers, supranote 18, at I111 (reforming civil commitment

procedures requires "[c]ontemplating a terrain so craggy the Court might understandably wish to bum
its bridge before crossing it").
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It would be hard to demonstrate that any plausible, judicially mandated alternative to the drug regime would prove to be more beneficial. First, there are
the serious practical difficulties inherent in comparing the harms and benefits
of the drugs with the personal costs and advantages of remaining undrugged.
For example, how many fewer days of hospitalization equal how much freedom from drug-induced anxiety? 20 8 Even if such comparisons could be made,
the large numbers of people involved and our relative ignorance about actual
clinical outcomes present formidable problems. Moreover, such assessments
are complicated by the drug revolution's overwhelming success. Drugs eradicated the old psychiatric regime so thoroughly that nondrug and minimal drug
treatment modes are all but forgotten. Neither judges nor other decision-makers can confidently envision,
or weigh in the balance, a working, nondrug re20 9
gime or its benefits.
Even modest judicial interventions are problematical. For example, a judge
who requires careful medical consideration of drug refusers' complaints would
concentrate the hospital's resources on one group of patients-the refusers-at
other patients' expense. 2 10 Moreover, in the absence of a showing that state
psychiatry's drugging practices result from any lack of medical attention, this
remedy promises little. Of course, moderate judicial remedies are not necessarily futile. Empirical research might demonstrate that some forms of limited
judicial intervention made state psychiatry somewhat more beneficient. This
possibility, however, is not a likely one, and it would be surprising if it ever
came to pass.
None of this means that judges cannot advance constitutional values by a
political characterization of drugging. Doctors lying to patients, their infliction
of serious drug harms, and their affronts to patient dignity can be checked by
court decree. However, the likely overall effects of judicial intervention in
drug matters remain hard to calculate.
F. CONSTRAINTS ON JUDICIAL POWER

1. The Costs of a Political Characterization
The last two factors discussed bear heavily on the final consideration-the
implementation problems attendant on a political characterization of state
drugging by courts. The traditional allocation of drugs to the medical realm
will color the attitudes of the public, as well as that of other branches of government, toward the courts' efforts. In addition, as just noted, the problem of
devising an alternative to drugs in any significant number of cases is daunting.
The result is that political characterization of state drugging promises problematical results when there is little initial social tolerance for judicial activity
in this area.
There are other obstacles to political characterization, including the near208. Brief for the American Psychiatric Ass'n as Amicus Curiae at 23-25, Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d
836 (3d Cir. 1982) (en banc) (noting role of drugs in shortening period of hospitalization).
209. But seegenerally Carpenter, McGlashan & Strauss, supranote 82 (discussing feasibility of treating acute schizophrenia without drugs in research setting).
210. Shavill, supranote 30, at 593 (disruptive patients require inordinate amount of stafftime, resulting in less time spent on nondisruptive patients).
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universal psychiatric endorsement of drugs. Were the medical profession divided over drugs, or largely opposed to them, court intervention would enjoy
some professional support.2 1' As it is, however, a political characterization
confronts not a debatable psychiatric measure but the profession of psychiatry
itself. This makes state psychiatrists even more incredulous about political
characterizations of drugging. 2 12 Moreover, pro-deinstitutionalization physicians and officials will be unsympathetic to court decisions that reinvigorate
mental hospital custodial techniques and stall the movement from public to
private custodial settings. Additionally, state hospitals will resent any legal
checks on their use of drugs to insure against patient-caused harm. The result
is that compliance with judicial edicts in drug matters will be grudging at
2 13
best.
The hospitals' attitude and stance are important. Mental hospital staffs that
adamantly oppose a judicial decree are in an excellent position to undermine
it. The affected institutions are isolated; the affected patients, many of whom
are incompetent 2 4 or easily provoked, are not in a good position to challenge
staff actions, staffs control the records, and patients seem untrustworthy. At
some point it must also be acknowledged that staff-if they are to run the
institution at all-must have their way.
The major obstacle to a political characterization, however, is that the struc211. There is nothing remarkable about justifying a political characterization partly on the ground
that it produces results (some) professionals can accept. When a political characterization is consistent
with professional viewpoints, the case for judicial intervention is enhanced considerably.
For example, a federal district court declared state institutionalization of the mentally retarded to be
per se unconstitutional, relying on what I would call a political characterization of the problem. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1317-18 (E.D. Pa 1977), aF'dinpart and
rev'd in part,612 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc), rev'd and remanded,451 U.S. 1 (1981), on remand,
673 F.2d 647 (3d Cir.) (en banc) (reinstating judgment on state law grounds), rev'don othergrounds, 104
S. Ct. 900 (1984). The district court, however, made much of mental health professionals' opposition to
large-scale state institutions as counter-therapeutic. See id at 1311, 1313; cf In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967) (formalized due process procedures in juvenile court comport with professionals' views on effective treatment of juvenile offenders).
212. See Armstrong, The Use of PsychotropicDrugs in State Hospitals:A Legal or MedicalDecision,
29 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 118 (1978); Gill, Side Effects of A Right to Refuse Treatment
Lawsuit: The Boston State HospitalExperience, in REFUSING DRUGS IN MENTAL INSTITUTIONS VALUES IN CONFLICT 81 (1982); Mils, Gutheil, Igneri & Grinspoon, Mental Patients'Knowledge of InHospitalRights, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 225 (1983).
213. Indeed, state hospitals and physicians resist even nonjudicial efforts to regulate drugs. See
Armstrong, supranote 212, at 119-20 (describing Michigan and California state physicians' "disgruntled" response to modest internal measures and their resort to "civil service grievances and. . . civil
injunctions and restraining orders"); see also Roth & Appelbaum, What We Do and Wat We Do Not
Know.4bout Treatment Refusals in Mental Institutions,in REFUSING DRUGS IN MENTAL INSTITUTIONS
VALUES IN CONFLICT 179 (1982) (in New York, state doctors ignored internal regulations about
drugs). Court interventions surely will be received with even less understanding, sympathy, and tolerance. Indeed, when New Jersey state hospitals adopted de minimus internal procedures, doctors at
every level-including the Division of Mental Health directorate-ignored and subverted the rules.
For a discussion of de minimus nature of the regulations, see infra note 252; Mills, Yesavage & Gutheil,
Continuing CaseLaw De Pelopments in the Right to Refuse Treatment, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 715, 717
(1983) (co-authored by the defendant in Mills v. Rogers, this article describes New Jersey's system of
legal checks as a "minimal" one); for a discussion of compliance with the regulations, see Rennie, 476 F.
Supp. at 1303, 1305 (state central office for mental health failed to insure implementation of regulation;
some hospitals remained totally unaware of regulation's existence because no one bothered to inform
them; some hospitals made no pretense of complying; hospitals that nominally observed regulations in
fact failed to acknowledge patients' drug refusals; force, threats of force, and punishment were employed to avert self-imposed, medically oriented procedural opportunities for patients).
214. See infra note 226 (discussing incompetency issue).
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ture of state psychiatry is premised on untrammeled drugging. Drugs keep the
mental hospital rolls low.2 1 5 At some point, a staff with all the goodwill in the
world will not be able to manage more patients without drugs or fundamental
changes in hospital staffing, approach, and procedures. 21 6 Drugs keep order
within the hospitals. Different techniques and a new moral consensus about
them must be put into place if drugs cannot be used. These changes entail
considerable restructuring, rethinking, and expense. Courts hardly would be
the ideal supervisors of this process, and no court has attempted to do so. Simply withdrawing drugs by court decree without planning would threaten chaos.
Therefore, courts cannot even tinker with drugging without threatening the
sine qua non of today's state psychiatry and thus flirting with disaster.
2. The Proper Place for Consent
One might object to this Draconian picture on the ground that the impact of
a political characterization would be limited because few patients ever refuse
drugs, particularly for any length of time. 21 7 It is true that the reported incidence of state hospital drug refusal is low. 218 It would be a mistake, however,
to judge the drug refusal phenomenon on that limited basis.
The most difficult patients could well turn out to be drug refusers. Moreover, drug refusal, once officially sanctioned, could become contagious, a possibility that worried the doctors in Rennie.21 9 Thus, a few undrugged patients
could impose significant burdens despite their small numbers.
A still more important consideration is that tefusals are significantly underreported by hospitals, 220 so the problem's dimensions generally are underestimated. Many patients find drugs objectionable. In Rennie, for example,
doctors testified that only a handful of patients refused drugs, yet thousands of
patients' charts contained an order for injectible medication, to be given "as
needed," and usually the need arose when patients were unwilling to swallow a
pill.22 ' Indeed, New Jersey patients who refused a pill, but then failed to physically resist the subsequent drug injection, did not-by the hospitals' reason215. See Armstrong, supranote 212, at 120 (noting "dramatic decrease in the [state hospital] popula-

tion after the introduction of psychoactive medications").
216. One successful experiment in low- or no-drug treatment of acute schizophrenia employed a

large motivated staff to deal with a small number of patients. Carpenter, McGlashan & Strauss, supra
note 82, at 16-17. Nothing in their work suggests that discontinuing drugging on a wide scale, while
holding staffing and other organizational features constant, would produce anything short of chaos.
217. See Brief for the New Jersey Dep't of the Public Advocate, Division of Mental Health Advocacy as Amicus Curiae in support of Respondents, Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982).
The Public Advocate, the plaintiffs' attorney of record in Rennie, argued in Rogers that the medica-

tion review decree was viable, based on the "steady decline in the number of hearings requested and
conducted in the nearly two years of operation of the system." Id at 44; see also id at 54-55 (citing

"steady decline" in frequency of hearings requests). Notably, in the last month of the district court
Rennie decree, only one hearing on drug refusal was held in the five mental hospitals under the decree.
Id at 30. Almost certainly, the hospitals had simply returned to their entrenched practice of refusing to
acknowledge drug refusals. See infra text accompanying notes 221 to 224.
218. See, e.g., Rennie, 476 F. Supp. at 1303-04 (noting low refusal ratio at New Jersey mental hospitals); Geller, supra note 20, at 612 (4 out of 281 state patients acknowledged as refusers).
219. See Rennie, 462 F. Supp. at 1152 n. I (John Rennie's discussion of court opinion encouraged
other patients to refuse medication).
220. See supra notes 213, 217, and 218.
221. Rennie, 476 F. Supp. at 1304 (citing to trial record).
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ing-count as refusers. 222 If a refusing patient ever willingly accepted a pill,
New Jersey doctors deemed the rejection recanted. 223 Moreover, patients who
Without staff pressure,
refuse drugs do so despite tremendous staff pressures.
224
the number of refusers would surely be higher.
The potential extent of drug refusal and the impact of these lawsuits can be
explored in another way. It is estimated that nearly one-half of all patients
suffer drug-induced dysphoria or depression. 2 25 These patients should be inclined to refuse. Partially overlapping with this group are patients who face
tardive dyskinesia or other serious side effects, along with those who stand to
benefit only slightly or not at all from being drugged. If properly informed,
many of these patients should refuse as well. Other patients who simply are
frightened by the drugs and the prospect of drug harm also would, rightly or
wrongly, refuse drugs. Added to this number should be patients who would
refuse drugs for irrational reasons, or for no reason at all. It is impossible to
arrive at a precise figure, but the number of potential refusers-people who
would rationally or irrationally refuse, if given a fair chance-undoubtedly is
large.
Moreover, the reach and potential impact of right-to-refuse drug case law
extends beyond the number of drug refusers. If drug refusers are constitutionally entitled to "professional medical judgment" or the "least restrictive alternative," those who accept drugs must not enjoy any smaller entitlement. We
cannot deny the Constitution's solicitude to mental patients who cooperate
with the doctors, while providing it to patients who resist, because such an
approach would discourage cooperation for no apparent reason. Moreover,
these legal standards for drug refusal are framed so as to relate to minimum
decencies-albeit that judges disagree on what those minima should be. Under
these standards, then, it would be wrong to accord "consenting" patients any
less protection than patients who refuse. Indeed, courts that judge forcible
drugging by the professional medical judgment test could hardly develop a
more lenient, yet still rational standard: would "near-professional judgment"
suffice for those who consent to drugs? Thus, the substantive constitutional
standards for drug refusal are also applicable to consensual state drugging.
In any event, "consent" is a very thin constitutional reed, considering the
debilitated mental condition of many patients, 226 the incessant institutional
pressure to accept drugs, 227 and the absence of information in mental hospital
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
totally

See id ("extensive use" of forced injections when patients refused pill not reflected in statistics).
Id
See Rennie, 476 F. Supp. at 1304.
See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
There is no denying that many mental patients have impaired judgment, and that some are
incapable of understanding. See, e.g., Rennie 476 F. Supp. at 1305 (majority of individuals

studied "did not or could not act on their own behalf in a fully autonomous, responsible manner");

Appelbaum, Mirkin & Bateman, EmpiricalAssessment of Competency to Consent to PsychiatricHospitalization, 138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1170, 1174 (1981) (large percentage of patients voluntarily entering

hospitals not competent to consent to own admission). Many other patients, of course, are capable of
understanding and making intelligent decisions, though the quality of their judgment varies. See Rogers,478 F. Supp. at 1361 (in spite of impaired relationship to reality, most committed patients able to

appreciate risks and benefits of medication).
227. See supra note 213; see also A. BROOKS, supra note 190, at 915 (noting inherently coercive

atmosphere of mental institutions).
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wards about drug harms. 228 To ignore these differences and presume that
mental patients' judgment is by and large unimpaired, that state hospitals are
indifferent about patient drug-taking or are powerless to influence patients'
choices, or that drug side effects are made known to patients and fairly portrayed by staff, is to base constitutional adjudication on a fiction.
State psychiatrists often claim that, when mental patients withhold consent
to treatment, it should count for less than any other medical client's withholding of consent. A mental patient's grant of consent, then, clearly should
also count for less.229 Indeed, the factors that vitiate consent in mental hospitals generally impel patients to accept, rather than reject, drugs. Impaired
judgment leads patients to succumb to institutional pressures on drugging
when it is unwise to do so.
Patient attitudes about drugs are not irrelevant; to the contrary, it is generally agreed that patient-physician cooperation and trust are extremely important in psychiatry. 230 Moreover, patient drug refusal, whether explained
rationally or not, can be a cry of pain about drug side effects. 23' Furthermore,
in close cases there is every reason to accept the patients' judgment about
drugs. When the arguments about drugs are in balance, we might as well defer
to the patient, even if his or her judgment is questionable. 232 Nonetheless,
patient consent does not deserve to be the basic organizing principle in drug
matters, and, as will be shown, courts have not treated it as such, even when
they may pay lip service to it.233 Just as we as a society should second-guess
psychiatrists more than we do other physicians, 234 so should we second-guess
state mental patients' judgments more than other medical clients': wrong decisions to accept or refuse Prolixin should receive less deference than misjudg235
ments about one's own gall bladder surgery.
228. See Rennie, 476 F. Supp. at 1309.
229. See Geller, supranote 20, at 615. ("Only express [drug] refusal is addressed. If a patient refuses
his medication, the question of competency is raised. If he takes his medication, his competency is
never questioned"). The problem of incompetent consent to drugs generally is ignored. Id But cf
Rennie, 476 F. Supp. at 1314 (judicially mandated procedures for protecting incompetent patients' right
to consent).
230. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 584 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (recognizing patient
cooperation with mental health professionals as fundamental to effective therapy).
231. This point is often overlooked by medical polemicists. See, e.g., Appelbaum & Gutheil, supra
note 61, at 310-13. The authors tested mefital patients' asserted reasons for refusing drugs against constitutional theory, in effect treating the patients' remarks as pro se legal complaints and finding them
wanting.
This strained approach led the authors in at least one instance to dismiss a valid drug complaint. In
the cited article, Appelbaum and Gutheil counted a patient as "overtly delusional" because the patient
believed "that the staff was unwittingly giving the wrong medication thus making the patient worse."
Id at 310. In another report of the same work, however, the authors described a patient "who had been
convinced that the staff had been giving her an incorrect medication that had led to her confusion. In
fact, measurement of plasma tricyclic anti-depressant levels revealed them to be in a markedly toxic
range." Appelbaum & Gutheil, Drug Refusak A Study of PsychiatricInpatients, 137 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 340, 342-43 (1980).
232. Judge Brotman observed in Rennie. "It is. . . difficult for any person, even a doctor, to balance
for another the possibility of a cure of his schizophrenia with the risk of permanent disability in the
form of tardive dyskinesia. Whether the potential benefits are worth the risk is a uniquely personal
decision which, in the absence of a strong state interest, should be free from state coercion." 462 F.
Supp. at 1145.
233. See infra Part III (discussing Rennie and Rogers decisions).
234. See supranotes 188 to 199.
235. See id Compare Wexler's treatment of competency as organizing principle for state psychiatry,
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The consent issue, which stands at the forefront in rhetoric about the "rightto-refuse-drugs," in fact is a secondary concern. In the final analysis, the rightto-refuse-drug cases depend upon the Constitution's tolerance for state drugging and the public mental health regime premised on it. It makes no difference whether or not a patient consents to drugging.
III.

THE COURTS' RESPONSE:

RENNIE AND ROGERS

The dilemmas of state-professionalism take their sharpest form in the controversy over state drugging. On one hand, a political characterization of
drugging is more strongly supported for that practice than for other widely
accepted forms of professional treatment.23 6 As demonstrated earlier, the biological effects of drug use set drugs dramatically apart from corporal punishment and involuntary confinement. 237 These physical effects are far more
harmful 2 38than compulsory vaccination, forced sterilization, or simple
custody.

Moreover, the drug regime bears the marks of state overreaching. The Constitution seemingly was designed to prevent that regime's characteristic indifference to personal dignity and suffering, its unwillingness to draw relevant
distinctions between individuals, and its pervasive, indiscriminate application. 239 In addition,
the profession of psychiatry's claims to judicial deference
240
are tenuous.
While a professional characterization of state drugging would preserve the
status quo, a political characterization could lead courts to challenge current
drug policies. The courts' direct involvement with, and responsibility for,
mental hospital functioning would increase dramatically, with uncertain results. Some mistaken clinical decisions would be made, and patients who
should have drugs might not receive them. The number of institutionalized
patients would expand, the risk of violent behavior would increase, and custoD. WEXLER, supranote 27, at 202-03, with Plotkin's discussion of the same subject, Plotkin, supra note
30, at 485-90. Both Wexler and Plotkin seem to attach an a priori value to making competence the
building block of mental patients' rights. Yet Wexler notes that the competency concept is used as
"camouflage when condemning choices the consequences of which are unacceptable." D. WEXLER,
supra note 27, at 203. I am simply proposing that for mental hospital drugging practices, it would be
best to strip away the "camouflage" and see the problem for what it is. Where Wexler was concerned
about the adverse consequences to the mentally ill of applying the label "incompetent," I am more
worried about the consequences of imputing an ability to decide about and resist drugging where, in
fact, no such ability exists.
236. When state professional treatment carries serious consequences and is suspect in professional
circles at the same time, see BROOKS, supranote 190, at 902 (avowedly experimental psychosurgery), the
case is quite different, and the argument for a political characterization is enhanced considerably. If the
same measure is designed to inflict suffering, as some "behavior modification" programs are, that argument also becomes almost overwhelming. E.g., Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973);
Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1973). For a discussion of the medical, legal, and moral
issues attendant on behavior modification, see Friedman, Legal Regulation of 4ppliedBehaviorAnalysis
in MentalInstitutions andPrsons, 17 ARiz. L. REv. 39 (1975); Note, Conditioningand Other Technologies Used to "Treat?" 'Rehabilitate?" 'Demolish?"PrisonersandMentalPatients,45 S. CALIF. L. RE.
616 (1972). These extreme cases are far easier for a court to deal with; they almost invite a political
characterization.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 85 to 104.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 105 to 111.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 131 to 187 (discussing self-characterization of statedrugging).
240. See supra text accompanying notes 189 to 199 (discussing history of psychiatric intervention).
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dial measures like physical restraints and seclusion would become more
evident.
Political characterization, however, would not require barring drugs. While
states can be guilty of overreaching with drugs, there is no reason to think that
drugs themselves are a form of overreaching. Indeed, a political characterization would probably continue to allow the drugging of a majority of mentally
ill patients in state institutions. A substantial number of the patients, however,
would be drug free, and the amount of artificial, state-induced harm would
decrease, even as the amount of naturally caused suffering increased. State
deception would stop, and terrifying forms of state overreaching would be
checked. Yet a court's political characterization of drugging would be widely
regarded as judicial usurpation of medical prerogative, 24' an action that might
create chaos in mental hospitals 242 and that could entail far-reaching judicial
involvement in state psychiatry's affairs 243-an involvement that could prove
futile, or worse. The many patients244who benefit from drugs might well suffer
as a result of judicial intervention.
A court, however, does not extract itself from the fray simply by characterizing state drugging as either professional or political: much more remains to be
decided. A political characterization could result in an absolute right to refuse
drugs, a constitutional bar against drugging in the event of certain side effects,
a requirement that drugs constitute the "least restrictive alternative," or any
number of other substantive rights. Procedurally, it could require anything
from a full-fledged trial with counsel to the most informal administrative proceeding. Similarly, a professional characterization might translate substantively into the right to an "adequate," "accepted," or "recognizably
professional" judgment. Procedurally, the professional characterization could
require the opportunity to speak with the treating doctor, medical director, or
nurse, or it might translate practically into no rights whatsoever if the court
decides to deny all appeal from professional norms and methods of
245
proceedings.
241. See supratext accompanying notes 200 to 206 (discussing traditional allocation of authority in
drugging matters between politics and professionalism).
242. See supra text accompanying notes 207 to 210 (discussing problems associated with judicial
intervention).
243. See supratext accompanying notes 211 to 216 (discussing costs of political characterization).
244. Patients suffer different kinds of harms-drug induced, political, and dignitary-because courts
have stayed their hands.
245. Cf.Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) ("[A] public defender does not act under
color of state law when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a
criminal proceeding"). Viewed in one light, there is all the difference in the world between recognizing
a right which is characterized in professional terms and failing to recognize-as Polk County does-any
right at all. The "no right" option, however, lies on the same continuum-and in fact it responds to the
same kind of considerations-as does the "professional" right. The court could have applied a "professional judgment" standard to the Polk County problem, but chose to go just one step further. Compare
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (public school corporal punishment held to implicate constitutionally protected interests, but as to identity and scope of any enforceable rights that affected school
children might enjoy, Court reserves judgment; Court also finds that common law, post-deprivation
remedies available in state courts satisfy constitutional right to procedural due process). Ingraham
stands halfway between a purely professional version of constitutional right and the "no right at all"
option. Moreover, in theory, professional characterizations could produce rules framed in legal terms,
and legal characterizations might lead to professional-sounding rights. For example, a judge adopting a
political characterization might rule that drugging is constitutionally permissible only when every
conceivable doctor would so drug, or when the drugging doctor is a nationally renowned
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The basic dilemma remains: the choice of either a political or professional
characterization is not compelled. Nonetheless, the choice is particularly difficult because the stakes are high, and both choices carry grave consequences.
The courts' response to the state drugging cases shows judicial dissatisfaction
with what are the only available options.
A. THE RENNIE AND ROGERS DECISIONS

It is not surprising that a court confronted with this dilemma tries to endorse
both the professional and the political charters. In such cases, one of the two
charters takes on a purely symbolic role, as the political charter has in recent
appellate decisions. 246 After all, a court cannot have it both ways.2 47
Although some opinions reflect a professional characterization, 248 while
others reflect a political one,249 the most interesting decisions harness legalistic
rights to purely medical procedures. When a court harnesses professional procedures to political substantive rights, 250 the combination would appear inconsistent with the necessity of choosing a single characterization in the first place.
In Rennie v. Klein,25 1 for example, the Third Circuit upheld due process procepsychopharmacologist. Such a standard would ensure that few patients received drugs and would
check more abuses than some stringent sounding legal standards, like the compelling state interest test.
Framing the right in those terms, however, arbitrarily would outlaw most instances of arguably professional intervention without articulating any values that would justify the result.
Similarly, constitutional tests that were highly tolerant of state drugging because the court had chosen a professional characterization could be framed in legal rather than professional terms. For example, holding that drugging was permissible whenever it served a rational state interest would allow
almost all drugging of the mentally ill. It would, however, abandon any appeal to professionalism,
suggesting instead that powerful biological interventions are a prima facie constitutional way for states
to pursue legitimate state interests, a result unacceptable in our jurisprudence. Compare supra text
accompanying notes 51 to 57 with Judge Garth's concurring opinion in Rennie, 653 F.2d at 855.
246. See Rogers v. Okn,478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), affd in part,rev'din part,andremanded,
634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacatedand remandedsubnoma Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982), later
proceeding, Rogers v. Commissioner Dept. of Mental Health, 390 Mass. 489, 458 N.E.2d 308 (1983);
Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978), class injunction issued 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J.
1979), modfed, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc), vacatedandremanded 458 U.S. 1119 (1982), on
remand, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983) (en banc).
247. Compare Dershowitz, supra note 36.
248. See Rennie, 653 F.2d at 854 (Seitz, J., concurring) (opting substantively for professional judgment test and procedurally for "reasonable assurances that there will be an opportunity for adequate
input by various professionals and the patient").
249. Eg., Rogers,478 F. Supp. 1342, 1364 (D. Mass. 1979) (holding nonemergency forced drugging
unconstitutional unless patient declared incompetent by state court and a duly appointed guardian
consents); see also In re K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747, 751 (Okla. 1980) (legally competent adult involuntarily
committed to state mental hospital has right to refuse consent to administration of antipsychotic drugs).
Other opinions, although they sound political and legal themes in recognizing a right to refuse treatment, do not describe the right's contours or specify any remedy, and it is impossible to know whether
these courts ultimately will adopt a political or a professional characterization. E.g., Davis v. Hubbard,
506 F. Supp. 915, 938 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (procedures by which state determines whether patient can be
treated involuntarily with psychotropic drugs must satisfy due process, but court on record will not
determine what procedural protections are required); see post-judgment procedures implemented in
Davis, reported in 15 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 528 (1981).
250. No decision is known to me that does the opposite: tie a medical version of patients' substantive
rights to trial-type, legal procedures. Legal techniques are obviously ill-suited to medical decision
making.
251. 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981). A still-divided Third Circuit Court of Appeals redecided Rennie
after the Supreme Court's summary remand, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982), on remand, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir.
1983) (en banc), but the Court of Appeals' second Rennie opinion turned on the meaning of the
Supreme Court's remand instructions more than on the issue of the "least intrusive means" that had
divided the court before. Compare the opinion of Judge Garth ("[I]f we are to reconsider Rennie in
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dures that amounted to a purely medical system of peer review 25 2 and, at the
same time, announced the "least intrusive infringement" (or "least drastic
means" or "least restrictive alternative") doctrine-a stringent legal standard-as the substantive constitutional test for forcible drugging. 253 Similarly,
in determining the rights of allegedly incompetent mental hospital drug refusers, the First Circuit in Rogers v. Okin 254 combined a legal test-the "substituted judgment" standard, according to which unwanted medical treatment
can be administered only after a determination that, but for an incompetent
255
mental state, the patient would have accepted the treatment voluntarily with a purely medical procedural vehicle (i.e., "some mechanism for periodic
review by nontreating physicians of the full treatment history of patients to
ensure that the treating physicians are in fact attempting to make treatment
decisions as the patients themselves would were they competent"). 2 56 With
respect to dangerous patients, the First Circuit's approach closely resembles
that of the Third Circuit: "[Aintipsychotics . . . [should not be] forcibly administered," the Rogers court said, "absent a finding by a qualified physician
that. . . [the patients' constitutional interests in refusing] are outweighed in a
particular situation and less restrictive alternatives are unavailable." 25 7 Once
again, legal-sounding interests are to be enforced through distinctively medical
means-in this case, a "finding by a qualified physician" about the "least restrictive alternative" doctrine's application.
These decisions are anomalous because medical procedures in practice will
void legal rights. Doctors, nurses, and hospital attendants hardly will understand that the "least restrictive" test represents a higher level of constitutional
scrutiny than the "rational relationship between means and ends" test. 258 In
addition, the legalistic standards will not acquire a coherent meaning as they
are interpreted in real mental hospital cases. The concepts are not medical, and
therefore hospitals will not seriously attempt to clarify them. Medical practice,
light of the Supreme Court's ... [remand], we cannot employ the concept of 'least intrusive means'"),
id at 269, with the opinion of Judge Weis ("The majority reads into the Supreme Court's remand an
implicit disapproval of the least intrusive means test in the circumstances present here. I do not detect
any such message.") Id at 275 (Weis, J., concurring). No judge, however, altered his or her analysis of
the underlying problem. Judge Adams switched his vote, but he had not changed his mind ("Much as I
agree with the sentiment expressed in Judge Weis' opinion .... [w]hat does not appear to survive...
[the Supreme Court remand] is the least intrusive means test.") Id at 271 (Adams, J., concurring). For
this reason, the Court of Appeals' pre-remand Rennie opinions remain interesting and important exampies of the judicial conscience grappling with these drugging issues. For further discussion of the second set of Rennie opinions, see infra note 255.
252. 653 F.2d at 848-49. This was a system of patient-staff conferences culminating in a medical
review by the hospital director.
253. Id A majority of the court of appeals, however, repudiated the "least intrusive means" test after
the Supreme Court's summary remand, believing that the remand required such action. What the
Supreme Court intended is, however, unclear. See 720 F.2d at 274 (Weis, J., concurring).
254. 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub nom, Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291
(1982), laterproceeding,Rogers v. Commissioner Dept. Mental Health, 390 Mass. 489, 458 N.E.2d 308
(1983).
255. This test is legal, with antecedents in equity court practice, and it implicates no medical knowledge or skill. See generally Rogers v. Commissioner Dept. Mental Health, 390 Mass. 489, 458 N.E.2d
308 (1983); In re of Guardianship of Richard Roe III, 383 Mass. 415, 421 N.E.2d 40 (1981); Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
256. Rogers, 634 F.2d at 661.
257. Id at 657.
258. SeeRomeo, 644 F.2d at 183-85 (Aldisert, J., concurring) (difficult for doctors and other hospital
staff to second-guess courts in interpretation of constitutional rights).
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unlike common law adjudication, does not hone concepts in the process of
applying them. Doctors can make endless individual determinations, applying
their professional preferences to each one, and still not shed light on the meaning of "least restrictive alternative." Moreover, if a doctor did try to do so,
there would be no mechanism equivalent to the reports of legal decisions to
institutionalize the attempt and give it weight, influence, or permanence. If the
concepts acquired any meaning at all, they would acquire medical meanings
unrelated to their legal connotations and traditions. In any case, when medical
judgment calls for drugs, doctors are unlikely to believe that any less restrictive
alternative to the drugs exists, or that a competent person would reject the
doctor's orders and refuse drugs. Thus, the medical procedures of Rogers and
Rennie seem to render the cases' legal standards incomprehensible or futile.
B. TWO INTERPRETATIONS

The Rennie and Rogers opinions are susceptible to two interpretations. The
crucial consideration is the courts' attitude toward damage actions to redress,
on a case-by-case basis, the deprivation of an individual mental patient's substantive constitutional rights in matters of drugging. Under one interpretation,
Rogers and Rennie adopt legalistic substantive standards to make those standards available in individual damage actions. Under the other interpretation,
the legalistic tests are only judicial exhortations to state psychiatrists, which
will never be applied or enforced as written. Both of these possibilties require
some explanation.
1. The Legalistic Standards Apply to Individual Damage Actions
Although individual damage cases nominally raise many of the same substantive issues as class-action lawsuits, their potential impact-in the context of
state drugging, at least-is very different. Individual substantive claims do not
directly involve the court in hospital-wide operations, as class actions threaten
to do. Likewise, the damage remedy, unlike the injunction, does not entail
judicial oversight of mental hospitals. Moreover, substantive legal claims do
not have the same potential for across-the-board impact as do procedural
claims. A procedural due process ruling, even in a nonclass-action suit,
promises change in the hospital's approach to every patient's case. Assuming
that the defendants regard the court's legal conclusions as binding, the procedures mandated for one must be applied to all. By contrast, a court's decision
that a particular forced drugging episode violated a substantive, legal standard-the least restrictive alternative doctrine, for example-may have precedential value, but it does not necessarily dictate changes in the hospital's
approach toward every patient. One can quibble about the decision's meaning
case will often be unclear, and very little,
since the dispositive elements in 2the
59
in fact, may have been decided.
259. Of course, a legal test might be definite and precise enough to provoke change across the board.
For example, if courts ruled that any permanent drug side effect constituted an actionable constitutional wrong under the least restrictive alternative doctrine, the effect on state psychiatry would be
drastic, immediate, and widespread. It is doubtful, however, that courts soon will devise such a definitive, far-reaching interpretation of the "least restrictive alternative" test.
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Divorced from issues of procedure in cases involving a single patient asking
for compensation rather than an injunction, and thereby subjecting himself to
trial by jury, these individual damage lawsuits arguably tilt the scales toward a
political characterization of state drugging. The arguments against political
characterization-that it would cast courts in the role of medical usurpers, dis26 0
sipate the courts' social capital, and lead to intrusive or futile remedies apply with much greater force to class-action lawsuits and, because of their
inherent, across-the-board quality, to procedural claims. Thus, a judge might
decide on a professional characterization for class-action forced drugging cases
and, without any moral or logical inconsistency, on a political characterization
for individual, substantive damages actions. If legalistic standards are to govern individual damage actions, however, they must be constitutionally based
and must at least be acknowledged in every litigation context, including classaction suits. Based on this view, the medical procedures of Rennie and Rogers
never were designed to advance the legal substantive standards. Rather, these
courts decided against enforcing patients' substantive rights via a class action
and instead created legal rights to be asserted in individual suits for damages.
Although such a judicial stance is not self-defeating or incoherent, it does
raise its own problems. Legalistic substantive standards can have a dramatic,
sudden impact on state drugging even if individual damage actions are their
only means of enforcement. The legal standard's potential reach is uncertain:
a great deal of the state's professional enterprise could fall before it, perhaps in
unanticipated ways. The "least restrictive alternative" doctrine, to the extent it
has any definite content, may turn out to proscribe most state hospital drugging practices, for instance. Should that happen, either state psychiatric institutions will undergo sudden, radical change because of legal rules-a
circumstance this view is supposed to avoid--or the law will have to beat an
unseemly retreat and reformulate itself to accommodate existing psychiatric
practices. Failing either of those alternatives, the Constitution will be markedly out of harmony with state psychiatric institutions since much of what the
relevant state officials do would be unconstitutional according to the prevailing
legal interpretation. This discrepancy between law and practice exacts a high
price-if not in monetary damages assessed, then in lost judicial credibility.
Furthermore, doctors might regard the announced "least restrictive alternative" doctrine (or other legalistic standards) as sharply discordant with their
drugging practices, and react accordingly, even if judges in fact take a more
modest view. The result of that misunderstanding would be minimum constitutional protection and maximum disruption of state psychiatry.
The ultimate impact of this judicial stance is hard to gauge. It depends on
the vagaries of litigation. A series of successful, individual lawsuits could provoke a strong reaction among state psychiatrists and dramatic changes-particularly if damages were assessed because of some common occurrence, such
as doctors causing tardive dyskinesia without acknowledging or attempting to
ameliorate it. On the other hand, if few mental patients litigate individual
damage actions (because jurors prove unsympathetic, unbelieving, or ungener260. See supranotes 200 to 216 and accompanying text (discussing traditional allocation of authority
in drugging matters).
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ous) and if state doctors do not react strongly to the mere promulgation of a
legal standard, then the impact will be slight or nil. As already noted, the first
possibility leads to the kind of upheaval this view is presumably designed to
avoid.26 ' The second possibility transforms the denial of class-action relief
into a death blow for patients' drugging rights, since no effective avenue of
judicial relief would remain.
2. The Legalistic Standards Are Only Judicial Exhortations to State
Psychiatry
Whatever difficulties attend the first interpretation of Rennie and Rogers,the
courts' opinions themselves suggest that the interpretation itself can be wrong
and that the judges had something else in mind. Both decisions imply that
their legal standard is only hortatory-nothing more than a judicial admonition to state psychiatrists-and that the patients' substantive constitutional entitlement is medical, not legal, in nature after all.
Thus, the Rennie court described the initial decision to forcibly administer
drugs as "medical" 2 62 and stated that "promulgation of the [least restrictive
alternative] standard merely serves to advise the psychiatric community that a
conscious weighing of the constitutional liberty interest in any determination
of proper treatment alternatives is necessary. '263 Rogers is similar. The array
of factors bearing on a decision for forced drugging, according to the First
Circuit, "almost defies. . . reviewability." 264 Such an observation is surely
inapposite to the application of stringent legal standards in individual damage
actions. Moreover, Rogers instructed the district court to "leave [the] difficult,
necessarily ad hoc balancing [of interests] to state physicians [whose conclusions 'defy reviewability'] and limit its own role to designing procedures for
ensuring that the [dangerous] patients' interests in refusing antipsychotics are
taken into consideration [by doctors] and that antipsychotics are not forcibly
administered absent afinding by a qualifiedphysician that those interests are
outweighed in a particular situation and less restrictive alternatives are unavailable. '2 65 Procedures should be designed only to see that "treating physidecisions as the patients
cians are in fact attempting to make treatment
'266
themselves would were they competent.
261. Indeed, this approach may produce more disharmony between judges and state psychiatry than

would coupling legal procedures with legal standards. Arguably, legal-type procedures stand a better
chance of producing decisions that are not actionable when judged by legal criteria. By contrast, medical procedures-not designed with legal criteria in mind-will produce decisions comportable to those
criteria only by happenstance. Thus, the likelihood of actionable outcomes may be increased by dayto-day medical procedures.
262. 653 F.2d at 848.
263. Id at 847 (emphasis added). Rennie is not consistent on this point, however. The majority
opinion had stated earlier that the least restrictive alternative standard "directs attention to and requires
whose cost benefit ratios, weighed from the
which areIdunnecessary
aVoidanee
of... [intrusions]
patients' standpoint,
are unacceptable."
(emphasis or
added). The court also stated, "What is reviewable is whether the choice of a course of treatment strikes a proper balance between efficiency and
intrusiveness." Id Judge Weis, who had authored the court of appeals' first Rennie opinion, stated in
his later Rennie concurrence, "[T]he least intrusive means standard . . . simply requires a carefully
considered choice." 720 F.2d at 277.
264. Rogers, 634 F.2d at 656.
265. Id at 657 (emphasis added).
266. 634 F.2d at 661 (emphasis added).
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With language such as that, Rogers and Rennie turn the "least restrictive
alternative" and "substituted judgment" doctrines into legal chimeras. State
doctors are only being admonished to apply the doctrines in day-to-day decision-making. The physicians' consideration, rather than whether their decisions comport with the legal standards, is decisive. Procedures should ensure
only that doctors are "tak[ing the relevant interests] into consideration" or "attempting to make" the proper decision; they should not ensure that the doc267
tors' decisions comport with independently ascertainable legal standards.
Whatever any doctor says is the least restrictive alternative, for example, is the
least restrictive alternative. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine drug decisions being impeached merely because the physician had never heard of that doctrine
or had refused to give it lip service. In fact, under Rogers and Rennie, patients
seem to enjoy the right-not to the "least restrictive alternative" or "substituted judgment"-but to a doctor's deliberate medical consideration. 268
C. AN ACT OF JUDICIAL FAITH AND ITS EXPLANATION

1. Faith in the Harmony between Law and Psychiatry
To the extent that Rogers and Rennie transform legal rights into medical
ones, an act of misplaced judicial faith about the relationship between legal
and psychiatric reasoning is responsible. According to Rennie, medical procedures promise to "adequately focus . . . the administrative proceedings [the
doctors' attention] on the facts that shape the constitutional standard [the least
26 9
restrictive alternative] and thereby protect the patients' interests at stake."
Rogers adopts a similar perspective; as already noted, the First Circuit sought
procedural assurances that "patients' [constitutional] interests in refusing antipsychotics are taken into consideration [by state doctors.]" 270 In both cases,
the idea is that judges' and state psychiatrists' reflections about the same problem will necessarily arrive at compatible conclusions. Based on this view, the
judges' conclusions come in the form of general constitutional principles, like
267. This is an application of the model that philosophers call "pure procedural justice." J. RAWLS,
supranote 23, at 85-86.
268. This approach translates without difficulty into appropriate jury instructions for individual
damage actions-that is, instructions that would acknowledge the least retrictive alternative doctrine,
for example, while in fact measuring state drugging by medical standards.
One possibility is to charge the jury in Rennids and Roger.? language. The instructions would cite
the least restrictive alternative doctrine and go on to advise jurors that the defendants were liable only
if they failed to "consciously weigh" less restrictive alternatives. Since a court is unlikely to impose
liability merely because a doctor failed to use the words "least restrictive alternative," jurors also would
be instructed that defendants' use of the words was unnecessary. The result is that "conscious weighing," and nothing more, would be required. CompareRomeo, 644 F.2d at 172-73 (if defendants considered other alternatives and ascertained that program adopted was least intrusive available, jury must
find defendants not liable).
Another possibility is to follow the Supreme Court's example in Romeo of announcing a legal standard and then hedging it with a "presumption" in favor of the doctors. The Romeo Court recognized a
mental patient's right to "reasonable" conditions of institutional safety--"reasonableness" being a legal
test. It then proceeded to vitiate the "reasonableness" standard by ruling that "decisions made by the
appropriate professional are entitled to a presumption of correctness. . . [which] is necessary to enable
institutions of this type-often, unfortunately, over-crowded and understaffed-to continue to function." Romeo, 457 U.S. at 324. This transforms the reasonableness test into, in effect, a medical
standard.
269. Rennie, 653 F.2d at 851.
270. Rogers, 634 F.2d at 657.
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the least restrictive alternative doctrine, while the doctors' conclusions will be
drug prescriptions. The courts' conclusions are those that doctors would have
formulated as guides to medical decision-making, if doctors thought in legal
terms, and the drug prescriptions will be those judges would have arrived at, if
they possessed the necessary psychiatric expertise.
This places an inherent and inevitable harmony between constitutional doctrine and state-psychiatric decision-making. There is no support for such a
view, however. In fact, it runs counter to the basic premisies of state-professional analysis and leads to self-contradictions.
Even after carefully deliberating, state psychiatrists often reach drug decisions no court could or would endorse on the merits.2 7 1 Moreover, to assume
the existence of this harmony is to deny that politics and professionalism constitute distinctive social realms subject to different charters: there is no occasion to worry about the distinctive logic of professionalism if the Constitution
and its judges invariably follow that logic too. If the Constitution and psychiatry are really pre-ordained to follow the same track, far-reaching judicial decisions will be in perfect harmony with state psychiatric practice. That is, courts
could substantively review drug decisions under the least restrictive alternative
standard and enforce broad class-action injunctions in drugging matters without disrupting the hospitals. In reality, as these courts are well aware, that is
not the case. Thus, when Rogers and Rennie posit a sublime consistency between psychiatry and legal constructs, they contradict their own rationales and
views of limited intervention.
2. An Explanation
An interesting question is why these courts bothered to create the chimera of
a legalistic standard (and legal-medical concordance) when they could have
announced, simply and forthrightly, the "deliberate medical consideration"
test. The explanation may lie in constitutional symbolism and the great difficulty and delicacy of state drugging cases.
An overtly professional characterization of state drugging is unattractive to
judges, who cannot bring themselves to ignore serious drug-caused harms or
state psychiatry's predrug-era excesses. Yet a political characterization's consequences may appear too far-reaching. The solution, it seems, is the attempt
to have it both ways. Rogers and Rennie announce a legalistic standard in
271. See, e.g., Rennie. The Third Circuit's apparent conviction that medical procedures inevitably
produce acceptable substantive drug decisions led that court to ignore inconvenient facts in the trial
record. The Third Circuit majority was "satisfied that the state's procedures, if carefully followed, pose
only a minor risk of erroneous deprivation." 653 F.2d at 850. Yet the trial record was a litany of cases
in which patients were examined by their treating doctors, treatment teams, and medical directors-all
during the pendency of litigation-and the result was inadequate medical fact-finding, lying by doctors,
punishment of the patients who complained about drugs, and the rigid insistence on drugging most
patients that is now characteristic of state psychiatry. See Rennie, 476 F. Supp. at 1300-03. Of course,
one might argue that "careful" adherence to medical procedures, as the Third Circuit envisioned it,
would avoid such results. However, the New Jersey doctors in fact were not careless in adhering to the
rules in these situations, although it is true that the rules were ignored in many other instances. See
supra note 213 (discussing resistance to nonjudicial effort to regulate drugs). The court's belief in the
as-yet unproven wonders to be worked by careful adherence to medical procedure is another example
of the misplaced judicial faith that underlies the rhetoric of Rogers and Rennie.
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deference to drugging's seriousness and enforce a medical test in deference to
the practical obstacles confronting any such legal test.
The cases' symbolism, however, is not without significance. Although the
Rogers-Rennie legalistic standards are only exhortations to psychiatrists, the
exhortations might conceivably do some good. It is one thing when doctors
know, because of their training and obvious moral considerations, that deliberate medical consideration is in order. It is another thing when courts remind
doctors of it.272
Moreover, Rogers and Rennie refuse to acknowledge state psychiatary as an
enclave where government can cause serious biological harms unhampered by
traditional constitutional standards. Those standards, under the decisions of
the First and Third Circuits, remain nominally in force, however, and express
in tolerathe idea that courts will not go beyond some as yet undefined point
2 73
ting drugging harms. The cases leave a door to the future open.
Nonetheless, given the importance placed upon drugging in state psychiatry
and the courts' actual decisions, significant changes do not seem likely. 274 In
addition, the courts' stance adds another problem-a lack of constitutional
candor-to the drugging cases. Courts appear to be enforcing basic political
rights (though the state hospitals probably know better) when, in fact, they are
ignoring them.
D. FROM EXHORTATION TO RITUAL: THE DISTRICT COURT RENNIE DECREE

The district court's Rennie decree, 275 although overturned on appeal, 276 was
272. "Any reluctance that some hospital staff members might have in meeting the standards [of the
state's Division of Mental Health and Hospitals] is unlikely to continue when it becomes apparent that
the court is prepared to enforce them." Rennie, 653 F.2d at 851. As a practical matter, however, staff
are likely to have learned the opposite lesson from the litigation: taking the courts lightly had no disadvantages for the hospitals and doctors in Rennie.
273. Both Rogers and Rennie hold out the prospect of a more political characterization of drugging
in the event that medical procedures do not work. Thus:
Accepting the premise that application of the Constitution to the setting of a state mental
health institution requires the most sensitive combination of deference to professional judgment and respect for competent individual judgment as to personal autonomy, we have
demonstrated our conviction that such a balance is most likely to be achieved through a variety of procedural devices designed for their suitability to this kind of institutional life rather
than for their similarity to judicial models. The record of exploration and evaluation of such
safeguards has yet to be made.
Rogers, 634 F.2d at 664.
The Third Circuit in Rennie went still further, cautioning that "if, after a reasonable time, it develops
that the state procedures are not working, then the [district] court may explore other methods to guarantee the patient's constitutional rights." 653 F.2d at 851.
Both courts refused to accept their own analyses as conclusive, leaving open the possibility that continued abuses would lead to a political characterization of state drugging. One might even speculate
that the courts are unwilling to take the drastic step of declaring a political characterization unless the
events that justify it take place, as it were, before their very eyes. At least in Rennie (as of the end of
1983) there had been no discovery or other formal proceeding directed at assessing the impact of the
state's procedures; indeed, the Rennie plaintiffs had not even asked the district court to reinstate the

court's requirement of written consent as a prerequisite to any drugging of state mental patients, even
though the Third Circuit once had invited such a request. 653 F.2d at 852 n. 17. It seems even more
unlikely that the plaintiffs would retry the entire case-as the Third Circuit, in effect, had required to
obtain any additional relief beyond the written consent forms.
274. Cf. The Prevention of Tardive Dyskinesia, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 756, 757-58 (1977) (Crane

noting ineffectiveness of medical exhortations).
275. 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1978).
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an original approach to the drugging dilemma-an approach in many ways
more interesting than that of the court of appeals. Because of its inherent interest, and because it has become a model for federal court consent decrees, 277
the solution of District Judge Brotman deserves notice here. It, too, reflects a
judical conscience torn between the professional and political characterizations
of state drugging.
The political element appears, on first impression, to be dominant. Substantively, Judge Brotman held that the constitutionality of forcible drugging
depended on "four factors": the patient's dangerousness, the patient's competence, the risk of permanent side effects, and the existence of less restrictive
alternatives. 278 "Dangerousness," "competence," and "less restrictive alternative" are obviously legal constructs, even though considerations of mental illness play an important part in their application. The fourth factor, "the risk of
permanent side effects," entails a discreet inquiry into physiological matters of
a kind quite familiar to courts. In these respects, the "four-factor" test seems
to bespeak a political characterization.
Nonetheless, the test has nonlegal overtones. "Dangerousness," "competence," and the "least restrictive alternative" are usually ultimate legal concepts since certain consequences follow if a person is "dangerous" or
"competent" or if a measure is not the "least restrictive alternative." Here,
however, none of the factors is meant to be decisive. The least dangerous (or
most competent) patient might be drugged when other factors point to that
conclusion, just as the most dangerous (or least competent) patient could escape drugging, depending on the other factors. Similarly, the risk of permanent side effects and the availability of less restrictive alternatives are questions
of degree. Although couched in legal terms, Judge Brotman's test can accommodate in this way a discretion broad enough to comport with medical decision-making, indeed with almost any decision. It recalls the First and Third
Circuits' visions of doctors "weighing" the facts about drugging and reaching
constitutional conclusions automatically. On the other hand, these factors are
starting points of analysis and, in the course of a succession of cases, could
crystallize into clear rules. The possibility of refining drugging tests does exist
in Judge Brotman's scheme, but it did not exist when courts attributed conclusive force to the deliberate decisions of doctors.
Given such open-ended standards; the crucial question is the forum: who
will apply the four factors? Judge Brotman's first opinion in the Rennie case
envisioned an administrative forum with the patient represented by counsel,
evidence taken via witnesses, and so on. 2 79 This process reflected a political
characterization of the problem, and it would have legalized drug decisionmaking. After further consideration and testimony, however, Judge Brotman
recanted this procedural system and replaced it with a hybrid of medical and
276. 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), on remand,720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983).
277. E.g., Order Approving Plan for Independent Psychiatric Review of Disputed Psychiatric/Medication Decision, Davis v. Hubbard, No. C73-205 (N.D. Ohio May 18, 1981), reportedat15 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 528 (1981).
278. 476 F. Supp. at 1297, 1314-15; seeRennie, 462 F. Supp. at 1145-48.
279. 462 F. Supp. at 1147-48.
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legal elements. 280
Every aspect of the resulting Rennie decree constituted a blending of the
medical and the legal into an apparently new judicial creation. The decree's
principal features were the "independent physicians" 28 1 -independent in the
sense that the state department of mental health, rather than individual state
hospitals, hired them.2 82 These "independents" evaluated drug refusers and
made the final decision about forced drugging.28 3 Judge Brotman's insistence
on their "independence"-even independence in name only-suggests a legal,
not a medical, structure, as does the added requirement that they write "opinions" addressing the legal 28
standards
(including the first and eighth amend4
ments) for forced drugging.
The decree's other important principals--"patient advocates" 285 -represented an even more obvious cross of medical and legal components. The "advocates" could be nurses, social workers, or attorneys. 286 Their role was to
assist patients in presenting drug objections to doctors. 287 Like the "independent" reviewing physicians, "advocates" would be attached to the central, state288
wide mental health office and not to the individual treating institution.
Thus, the "advocates" would speak to doctors on behalf of patients and were
independent-like lawyers. Since they would report to the hospital system,
however, and could possess nursing or social service backgrounds, they were
like medical personnel. True to their hybrid, legal-medical nature, the advocates were to be supervised by both a lawyer and a doctor in the central office
of the mental health department, which itself is a blend of a political institution and a hospital. 28 9 Moreover, the "advocates" had another power. Judge
Brotman allowed hospital doctors to declare a patient "functionally incompetent" and, based on that declaration, to force drugs unless the patient advocate,
in his or her own right, requested review by the "independent" physician. 290
In this context, an "advocate" is a combination of lawyer confessing judgment
against a client, medical reviewer, and lay juror passing on a question of civil
incompetency.
Although it was in force for almost two years, Judge Brotman's decree was
never subjected to close scrutiny in the litigation and its implementation deserves more attention than can be given it here. Some things, however, seem
obvious. The attempt to avoid a frank choice between a political and professional charter is clear. Here, the "political" or legal component is not a onetime exhortation, as it was in the courts of appeals' subsequent decisions. The
presence and work of the patient advocates and independent psychiatrists, and
the day-to-day paperwork routines entailed by the decree, constitute daily ritu280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.

476 F. Supp. 1294.
Id at 1306, 1313.
Id at 1310, 1313.
Id
Id at 1314-15.
Id at 1313.
Id
Id. at 1314.
Id at 1313.
Id
Id at 1314.
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als that remind hospitals of the court's presence and interest in mental patients'
fates. Repeated rituals are a more powerful token of the court's interest than a
one-time judicial exhortation.
There is little more than this ritual to the district court decree, which adopts,
in the end, a medical characterization of the problem. Stripped of its legalsounding terms, the district court injunction required only: that mental hospitals, in special cases, use physicians hired by the state department of mental
health, which is the ultimate employer of all persons working at the state hospitals; that, if a hospital wishes to avoid using those physicians, it must deem
the patient incompetent and obtain the concurrence of a mental health department nurse or social worker; and finally, that this nurse or social worker
should also assist patients in speaking about drugs with their doctors.
Perhaps the admonitory force of all this is more powerful than any one-time
exhortation, but both are paltry measures when compared to the drugging regime and the thrall in which it holds state psychiatry. A few more doctors
hired by the state and some additional nurses with the title "advocate" simply
are not going to change the imperatives of drug regime in state psychiatry or to
accomplish much more than the hospitals' own internal procedures, which also
failed.2 91 Although the decree's supposed effects have been praised,292 and
despite its obvious elegance, it seems unlikely that a state mental hospital system subject to the decree will behave very differently from one that is free from
it. Indeed, in the last months of the decree's validity, few patients were
ac2 93 It
knowledged to be drug refusers entitled to see the independent physician.
appears that drugging went on much as before. The drug regime will not yield
to mere judicial admonitions or ritual reminders of patients' human and legal
dignity.
IV.

JUDICIAL CANDOR AND BROADENING THE BASE OF DECISION-MAKING

While approaching other problems of state-professionalism, the Supreme
Court has often paid close attention to the existence of social and political
processes behind the extraordinary means at issue, such as sterilization, 294 corporal punishment, 295 and involuntary psychiatric hospitalization of children. 296 The Court has looked for assurances of a decision-making process
that was genuinely democratic, political, social, and moral.
An informed, truly democratic decision erases the taint of state overreaching, since the decision can be said to be that of the people themselves, and not
just that of the state. Moreover, given the clash of social principle in these
cases, the broadest possible base of social decision-making is desirable. If
forced administration of drugs to mental patients is to receive cultural sanction
as a state device, for example, courts should require more of a warrant than the
291. See supra note 213 (discussing state hospital and physician resistance to nonjudicial efforts to
regulate drugs).
292. Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief, supranote 217.
293. Id
294. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1926).
295. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
296. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
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edict of a state bureaucrat, the consensus of an American Psychiatric Association Convention, or the first impression of an as-yet uninformed body politic.
297
The clearest example of the court's approach is Ingraham v. Wright,
which challenged corporal punishment in public schools. In declining to require a pre-punishment due process hearing, the Supreme Court observed that
the corporal punishment issue had been debated exhaustively in educational
and political circles. It noted that many legislatures had spoken directly to the
issue, usually authorizing corporal punishment. It portrayed schools as open
institutions, traditionally subject to close community control via the local
school board and direct parental scrutiny. Ingrahamwould have been written
very differently-and the decision itself may well have been different-if corporal punishment had constituted a little-noticed social practice, accepted
without debate by an uninformed, disinterested, and largely unaffected citizenry and administered by bureaucrats without explicit legislative
authorization.
Other state-professionalism opinions sound similar themes. Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 98 upholding compulsory vaccination, found that the legislature had spoken about vaccination with the voice of the people on a matter of
pressing individual concern.2 99 Moreover-although the Jacobson court did
not say so-everyone's susceptibility to smallpox constituted a guarantee of
genuine popular interest, comparable to the Ingrahamparents' profound interest in their children's schools.
In these respects, sterilization of habitual criminal offenders obviously is a
different matter, and in Skinner v. Oklahoma,30 0 the Supreme Court struck
down a sterilization statute on equal protection grounds. Skinner introduced
the concept of strict scrutiny of legislative enactments touching fundamental
rights, such as the right to procreate. It is worth noting, however, that compulsory sterilization of repeat criminal offenders does not potentially affect the
entire population, as did the disease in Jacobson or the measures regarding
schoolchildren in Ingraham. For this reason, the issue held no personal immediacy for most people, and there was no guarantee of strong public interest and
real democratic deliberation. Furthermore, the statute brought into doubt fair
decision-making when it exempted white collar-type crimes 30 -presumably
the crimes some legislators themselves are more prone to commit-from the
sterilization edict.
State psychiatry will never be fully subject to these strong social and democratic influences, and as a result, the predicament of courts in state-psychiatric
controversies-and particularly in state drugging cases-is heightened. Unlike
smallpox, mental illness is not a democratic disease: people do not expect to
contract it, its victims are regarded as a distinct subclass of the population, and
there is generally little interest in the fate of the mentally 1l1202 The judiciary
297. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
298. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
299. Id at 34-35.
300. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
301. Id at 537. The statute exempted "offenses arising out of the violation of the prohibiting laws,
revenue acts, embezzlement, or political offenses." Id
302. See Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classicatimo 83 YALE L.J. 1237, 1258-68 (1974) (laws
based on mental health classifications should be strictly scrutinized due to minority status of classified
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cannot spark the conscience of the nation on these topics, because the mentally
ill do not sufficiently engage our attention or affect our interests. Our collective conscience is either silent, unthoughtful, or preoccupied. For the same
reason, courts cannot look askance at state psychiatric measures that lack
broad social endorsement, and we have no right to expect that endorsement in
the first place. Moreover, state drugging cases, where technical issues further
becloud the picture, are the most difficult of all state-psychiatric problems
from this point of view. Well-established social conventions about physical
custody can guide courts even in a mental hospital context, but drugs are new
and unfamiliar, with few cultural conventions about them worthy of judicial
consideration.
Notwithstanding the above, the judiciary could broaden the base of social
decision-making about drugs as much as possible by involving the legislature
and by engendering meaningful public debate. This approach would accomplish some diffusion of responsibility, and the more nonjudicial, nonpsychiatric deliberation there is, the better.
With regard to legislatures, courts might demand explicit statutory authorization for forcible drugging, and, in its absence, construe state statutes to bar
the practice. Of course, legislatures could enact perfunctory authorizations
without thoroughly examining the issue, and, where statutes expressly authorize forced drugging already, no court-ordered reconsideration would result.
Somewhat more ambitiously, courts might demand that statutes speak specifically to questions such as the amount and kind of harm which precludes further drugging, the procedures open to complaining patients, the available
alternatives other than drugs, and so on. Demand for such detail in a statute
would be an unusual judicial step, but no more extraordinary than the exhortations to psychiatrists that now appear in right-to-refuse drug opinions. It
could also provoke a broad public exploration of the issue.
Moreover, courts themselves, through their decisions and their factual findings, can call attention to state drugging and spur public debate. Already,
litigation records are the most reliable and comprehensive sources of information about actual drug practices at state hospitals. If class-action remedies
were reserved for demonstrated cases of hospital-wide abuse-the courts refusing to characterize drugging politically except upon a full factual showing of
abusive local conditions 303-plaintiffs would have to focus their litigation on
actual drugging as opposed to theoretical drug harms and benefits, and the
truth would be known. Furthermore, conditioning political characterizations
on local facts mitigates the taint ofjudicial usurpation. Certain named institutions, not psychiatry as a whole, would be the perceived targets of judicial
action, and debate about the propriety of the court's action would focus upon
facts, not upon stereotypes.
Airing the facts about state drugging serves a more basic judicial obligagroup); cf.Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230-31 (1981) (Court leaves open question whether classifications based on mental illness are suspect due to group's political powerlessness); Doe v. Colautti,
592 F.2d 704, 710-12 (3d Cir. 1979) (court notes that argument that mental illness is suspect classification requiring strict scrutiny not likely to succeed).
303. See Rennie, 653 F.2d at 865 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (noting trial court record of ongoing substantive violation by state officials of patients' liberty interests).
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tion-in Judge David Bazelon's words, the duty not to "play handmaiden" to
"social hypocrisy" by glossing over wrongs when the court is powerless to right
them. 3°4 "Courts cannot force legislatures to provide adequate resources for
treatment," 30 5 Bazelon said appropos of the newly recognized right to treatment, and when legislatures do not do so, the claim that "treatment" justifies
civil commitment is "chicanery" and "intolerable. ' 30 6 If courts can do nothing
altogether, they
else and are not about to order an end to civil commitment
30 7
still should avoid this "hypocrisy," Bazelon argued.
Whether courts defer to the drug regime or try to right it, judicial candor
about state drugging is even more of an imperative. With respect to the "right
to treatment," few people ever really believed that state hospitals were tolerably good treatment institutions. By speaking of "hypocrisy," Judge Bazelon
acknowledged this fact. In contrast, the history of drug treatment is a litany of
truths not told, decisions not taken, and judgments never candidly made.
What is involved is the judicial role as educator of the current generation,
witness to wrongs that will not be corrected and, if one is optimistic, prophet of
future right.
V.

CONCLUSION

Opinions in the style of the Rennie and Rogers courts obscure the real nature
of the drug issue, yield too much to professionalism, and add to the burdenat least the moral burden-of the mentally ill. They depict drugs as a selfevident medical concern, when in fact profound political issues are raised.
They portray drug excesses as aberrations when excess is in fact widespread,
systematic, and inevitable. In addition, they propound an unfounded faith that
deliberate medical consideration will necessarily produce drug decisions consonant with general constitutional values.
Mental patients who must endure drug harms deserve not the symbolism of
a specious harmony between psychiatry and the Constitution but, at a minimum, acknowledgement of their suffering. Almost surely, these victims observe more, though it is doubtful that courts will-or can-give it to them.
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